Property Rights Protection under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution: A Rationale for Providing Possessory Crimes Defendants with Automatic Standing to Challenge Unreasonable Searches and Seizures by Williams, Kent M.




Property Rights Protection under Article I, Section
10 of the Minnesota Constitution: A Rationale for
Providing Possessory Crimes Defendants with
Automatic Standing to Challenge Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures
Kent M. Williams
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Williams, Kent M., "Property Rights Protection under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution: A Rationale for Providing
Possessory Crimes Defendants with Automatic Standing to Challenge Unreasonable Searches and Seizures" (1991). Minnesota Law
Review. 1752.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1752
Property Rights Protection Under Article I, Section
10 of the Minnesota Constitution: A Rationale
for Providing Possessory Crimes
Defendants with Automatic Standing
to Challenge Unreasonable Searches and Seizures
Suppose that yesterday Smith moved to Minneapolis to
start her freshman year of college. She met Johnson, her new
dormitory roommate, and they began unpacking Smith's per-
sonal items and arranging their dormitory room. As they were
working, Johnson received an emergency phone call from her
parents that required her to fly home for several days. Before
leaving, Johnson left her car keys with Smith, so Smith could
deliver the car to Johnson's boyfriend.
Officer Brown, a Minneapolis police officer, saw Smith pull
out of the dormitory parking lot in Johnson's car. The car had
only one working headlight. Officer Brown stopped Smith, or-
dered her out of the car, and began a systematic search of the
interior of the vehicle. Finding nothing, he obtained the car
keys from Smith, opened the trunk, and found a bottle of pills
under the spare tire. Brown seized the pills and transported
Smith to the Hennepin County jail. After a test revealed the
pills were amphetamines, Smith was charged with unlawfully
possessing the prohibited substance.1
Because the fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution2 prohibits unreasonable government searches and
seizures, Smith might be able to contest Brown's search and
seizure as a violation of the fourth amendment.3 If successful, a
1. Unauthorized possession of over 50 grams of amphetamines is a felony
in Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. § 152.022(2)(2) (1990). Although arguably not
in physical possession of the pills, Smith would probably be charged with con-
structive possession of the contraband. See State v. Florine, 303 Minn. 103, 105,
226 N.W.2d 609, 611 (1975).
2. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
1255
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
court would be required to exclude as evidence the pills seized
by Brown in violation of Smith's fourth amendment rights.4
Before the court will suppress the pills as evidence, however,
Smith must first show a fourth amendment interest in either
the car or the pills, and then that the search and seizure in-
fringed this interest.5
The scope of individual interests protected by the fourth
amendment has undergone substantial change over the years.
Focusing exclusively on property rights, early federal courts re-
quired defendants to show the government had violated a prop-
erty interest in the place searched or the object seized before
challenging the lawfulness of a search and seizure.6 Later
courts expanded the scope of the amendment, protecting both
privacy and property interests.7 More recently, courts have fo-
cused exclusively on privacy protections to interpret the
amendment as protecting only those property interests that
create privacy interests.8
By requiring a property interest in the searched area or
seized object, early courts placed persons charged with posses-
sory crimes9 in the untenable position of having to admit to
possession10 to challenge the legality of the search or seizure."
Thus, before allowing the defendant to challenge a search and
seizure, courts required the defendant to present evidence
showing she had an ownership, possessory, or participatory in-
terest in the seized item.12 The prosecutor could then use this
evidence at trial to help establish that the defendant possessed
the item and therefore violated the possession statute.'3
The Warren Court fashioned three remedies to avoid this
dilemma. It granted possessory crimes defendants "automatic
standing" to challenge the legality of a governmental search or
seizure,14 expanded the amendment's protections to privacy as
4. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
9. This Note uses the phrase "possessory crime" to describe a criminal
offense that prohibits the possession of a particular item.
10. Possession of the prohibited item is an essential element of a posses-
sory crimes offense. See, e.g., State v. Eggler, 372 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (Randall, J., dissenting).
11. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
13. See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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well as property,' 5 and made a defendant's suppression testi-
mony inadmissible on the issue of guilt.16 The Burger Court,
however, discarded the automatic standing rule, and limited the
amendment's protections to privacy by requiring possessory
crimes defendants to demonstrate a "legitimate expectation of
privacy" in the area searched or the object seized to challenge a
search or seizure.17 Because of dissatisfaction with the "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy" standard, several state courts have
interpreted the search and seizure provisions of their state con-
stitutions to protect both property and privacy interests, and
grant automatic standing to persons charged with possessory
crimes.' 8
This Note considers whether Minnesota courts should con-
strue article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to pro-
tect property interests as well as privacy interests from
unlawful searches and seizures. Part I briefly traces the devel-
opment of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the fourth amendment, and surveys the state court responses to
recent Supreme Court interpretations. Part II analyzes the fac-
tors that the Minnesota Supreme Court considers when deter-
mining whether to interpret a Minnesota Constitutional
provision differently than a parallel federal corstitutional pro-
vision. Part III applies these factors to determine whether
Minnesota courts should interpret article I, section 10 to protect
property rights from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Note concludes that, because Minnesota courts should interpret
article I, section 10 to protect property rights, Minnesota courts
should grant possessory crimes defendants automatic standing
to challenge unreasonable searches and seizures. 19
I. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF FOURTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution
15. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
19. This Note considers solely whether article I, § 10 protects property
rights and should be interpreted to provide automatic standing to possessory
crimes defendants to challenge allegedly unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Note does not consider whether a particular search should be considered
reasonable or unreasonable. This Note assumes, however, that a defendant
who establishes standing and the unreasonableness of the search and seizure
will be entitled to suppression of the item as evidence from the trial.
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was intended to protect persons from indiscriminate searches
and seizures of private property by state and federal govern-
ments.20 A brief recount of the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the fourth amendment reveals that, in the
past twenty years, the Court has moved from an interpretation
of the amendment protecting only property rights to one pro-
tecting only privacy rights. This move has coincided with a nar-
rowing of the amendment's protections. As a result, the
Court's current interpretation of the fourth amendment inade-
quately protects possessory crimes defendants from govern-
ment abuses. Although the Minnesota Supreme Court
currently adheres to the United States Supreme Court's inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment, other states have turned to
their state constitutions for authority to provide additional pro-
tections to possessory crimes defendants.
A. FEDERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Under the "exclusionary rule," illegally-obtained evidence
is not admissible at trial.21 The main purpose of this rule is to
deter future police misconduct, rather than redress individual
20. For a more comprehensive discussion of the history of the federal
fourth amendment, see N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937); Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 396-401
(1974).
A primary cause of the American Revolution was colonial opposition to
the British policy of searching for and seizing contraband smuggled into the
American colonies. Simien, The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth
Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV.
487, 510-11 (1988). Historians maintain that this opposition was the "'the first
in the chain of events which led directly and irresistibly to revolution and in-
dependence."' Id. at 510 (quoting A. HART, AMERICAN HISTORY LEAFLETS, No.
33, Introduction, quoted in N. LASSON, supra, at 51). After the Revolution,
states enacted constitutions that protected their citizens from illegal searches
and seizures and other abuses by state governments. See J. HALL, JR., SEARCH
AND SEIZURE § 19 (1982) (observing that before the United States Constitu-
tional Convention, every state had a search and seizure provision in its consti-
tution). A search and seizure provision was later applied to the federal
government in the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. See
Scudiere, "In Order to Form a More Perfect Union": The United States, 1774-
1791, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL
THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 3,
14, 20 (1988) (noting that the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution after
several states demanded protection from federal abuses).
21. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The United
States Supreme Court required states to implement the exclusionary rule via




violations.22 At a pre-trial suppression hearing, a court will
suppress evidence the government intends to use against a de-
fendant at trial if the defendant can show that the evidence was
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment.23 To establish
such a violation, the defendant must satisfy a two-part test: a
personal interest protected by the fourth amendment,24 and a
violation of that interest by an unreasonable government
search or seizure.25 Early federal courts applied the "trespass
doctrine" to the first part of the test. In so doing, the courts
confined fourth amendment protections to property interests
by denying fourth amendment "standing" to any defendant un-
able to show either an ownership or possessory interest in a
22. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (citing United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) and United States v. Peltier, 422
U.S. 531, 536-39 (1975)). Finding the sole purpose of the exclusionary rule to
be a deterrent to culpable police misconduct, the Supreme Court has con-
cluded that this objective is not reached in cases where the officers act in good
faith. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984); Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88 (1984). Rather than let guilty defendants go
free in all cases for technical defects in search warrants, the Court has limited
application of the exclusionary rule to cases where the rule's deterrent pur-
pose is likely to be effective. See Note, The Exclusionary Rule: Not the "Ex-
pressed Juice of the Woolly-Headed Thistle," 35 BUFFALO L. REv. 937, 951
(1986).
In Sheppard, the Court described the "good faith exception" standard as
an "objectively reasonable basis for the officers' mistaken belief" that the war-
rant was valid. Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 988. For commentary on Leon, Shep-
pard, and related cases, see Bradley, The "Good Faith Exception" Cases:
Reasonable Exercises in Futility, 60 IND. L.J. 287 (1985); LaFave, "The Seduc-
tive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifica-
tions, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 895 (1984).
23. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383.
24. In applying the first part of the test, the United States Supreme Court
has consistently held that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights
which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted."
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1968). Thus, a person may only
challenge governmental conduct that infringes his own fourth amendment
rights, rather than another's rights. See also Doernberg, "The Right of the Peo-
ple'" Reconciling Collective and Individual Interests Under the Fourth
Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259, 263 (1983). Doernberg notes the Supreme
Court's longstanding opinion that constitutional rights may not be.vicariously
asserted, and that constitutional remedies are available only to "'the class for
whose sake the constitutional protection is given."' Id. (quoting Hatch v.
Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907)).
25. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) (warrant-
less entry into defendant's home during search for a third party held unrea-
sonable); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980) (warrantless entry
into defendant's home to conduct routine arrest held unreasonable); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (search of area outside arrested defendant's
immediate control held unreasonable).
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searched or seized object.26
In the 1960s, the Warren Court rejected the "trespass doc-
trine" and expanded the interests that the fourth amendment
protects. In 1960, a unanimous Court denounced the doctrine in
Jones v. United States,2 holding that possessory crimes defend-
ants would have "automatic standing" to challenge unlawful
searches and seizures.2s Consequently, possessory crimes de-
fendants no longer were required to show a property interest to
exclude the seized object as evidence, but could exclude the ob-
26. See, e.g., Ingram v. United States, 113 F.2d 966, 968 (9th Cir. 1940);
Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261, 266 (8th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
733 (1933); Shore v. United States, 49 F.2d 519, 522 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 283
U.S. 865 (1931); In re Dooley, 48 F.2d 121, 122 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v.
De Vasto, 52 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 678 (1931); Graham v.
United States, 15 F.2d 740, 742 (8th Cir. 1926), cert. denied sub nom. O'Fallon
v. United States, 274 U.S. 943 (1927); Goldberg v. United States, 297 F. 98, 101
(5th Cir. 1924); Driskill v. United States, 281 F. 146, 147-48 (9th Cir. 1922); see
also Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 51, 470 A.2d 457, 460 (1983) (observing
that early "federal courts of appeals generally required an affirmative claim of
ownership or possession of the seized property or a substantial possessory in-
terest in the premises searched to establish Fourth Amendment standing").
27. 362 U.S. 257 (1960). The defendant, Jones, was charged under a two-
count indictment after the government found narcotics in an apartment where
he was a guest. Id. at 258-59. The first count charged him with violating 26
U.S.C. § 4704(a) by "having 'purchased, sold, dispensed, and distributed' nar-
cotics ... not in or from the 'original stamped package."' The second count
charged Jones under 21 U.S.C. § 174 "with having 'facilitated the concealment
and sale of'" the narcotics. Under both statutes, possession of the narcotics
was sufficient proof for conviction, and "[p]ossession was the basis of the Gov-
ernment's case against [Jones]." Id. at 258.
Before trial, Jones sought to exclude the narcotics as evidence, citing FED.
R. CRIM. P. 41(e), which provided that "[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful
search and seizure" could move to suppress evidence obtained via an unlawful
search. 362 U.S. at 259-60. The government contested the defendant's standing
to challenge the search and seizure on the grounds that Jones "alleged neither
ownership of the seized articles nor an interest in the apartment greater than
that of an 'invitee or guest.'" Id. at 259. Jones admitted he did not lease the
apartment, but stated that it belonged to a friend who allowed Jones to stay
there and gave Jones a key. Id. Jones testified that he had clothing at the
apartment and had stayed there "maybe a night." Id. The trial court denied
Jones's motion to suppress the evidence obtained via the search. Id.
28. The Jones Court held that automatic standing would be available in
cases in which the defendant is charged with possession of the seized evidence
at the time of the search and seizure. See Jones, 362 U.S. at 263-65; see also
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973) (holding that because the de-
fendant was not charged with an offense "that includes, as an essential ele-
ment of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the time of
the contested search and seizure," the defendant was not entitled to automatic
standing). Thus, a possessory crimes defendant would be unable to challenge a
search and seizure occurring when he did not possess the contraband. Id.; see
also 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.3, at 589-95 (1978).
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ject merely by showing that the search and seizure were unrea-
sonable.29 In reaching its decision, the Court criticized the
trespass doctrine for forcing a possessory crimes defendant to
confront a "self-incrimination dilemma": the defendant either
testified to possession, an essential element of the alleged
crime, to challenge the search and seizure, or did not testify
and allowed the search and seizure to go unchallenged. 30 The
Court further condemned the doctrine because it allowed the
government to contradict itself by arguing that the defendant
had a property interest in the contraband sufficient to violate a
possession statute, but insufficient to warrant fourth amend-
ment protection.3' Later cases expanded the amendment's pro-
29. Jones, 362 U.S. at 263.
30. Id. at 261-62. The Court acknowledged that it is normally appropriate
to require that a defendant establish that "he himself was the victim of an in-
vasion of privacy." Id. at 261. The Court, however, further stated:
[P]rosecutions like this one have presented a special problem....
Since narcotics charges like those in the present indictment may be
established through proof solely of possession of narcotics, a defend-
ant seeking to comply with what has been the conventional standing
requirement has been forced to allege facts the proof of which would
tend, if indeed not be sufficient, to convict him. At the least, such a
defendant has been placed in the criminally tendentious position of
explaining his possession of the premises. He has been faced, not only
with the chance that the allegations made on the motion to suppress
may be used against him at the trial, although that they may is by no
means an inevitable holding, but also with the encouragement that he
perjure himself if he seeks to establish "standing" while maintaining
a defense to the charge of possession.
Id. at 261-62. The Court further noted that "several Courts of Appeals have
pinioned a defendant within this dilemma." Id. at 262 (citations omitted).
31. Id. at 263-64. The Court wrote:
Petitioner's conviction flows from his possession of the narcotics at
the time of the search. Yet the fruits of that search, upon which the
conviction depends, were admitted into evidence on the ground that
petitioner did not have possession of the narcotics at that time. The
prosecution here thus subjected the defendant to the penalties meted
out to one in lawless possession while refusing him the remedies
designed for one in that situation. It is not consonant with the ameni-
ties, to put it mildly, of the administration of criminal justice to sanc-
tion such squarely contradictory assertions of power by the
Government.
Id. The Court concluded that the possession charge itself constituted a suffi-
cient demonstration of a fourth amendment interest, and held that possessory
crimes defendants therefore had "automatic standing" to challenge allegedly
illegal government searches and seizures. Id. at 264.
In an alternative holding, the Court held that "[e]ven were this not a pros-
ecution turning on illicit possession," Jones had a sufficient connection to the
premises to challenge the search. Id. at 263. The Court criticized lower court
opinions granting and denying standing based on "[d]istinctions such as those
between 'lessee,' 'licensee,' 'invitee,' and 'guest'" that had only "historical" va-
lidity and were "often only of gossamer strength." Id. at 266. The Court thus
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tections even further to protect privacy as well as property
interests from unreasonable searches and seizures.32
In the 1970s, the Burger Court voiced its concern that the
Warren Court had interpreted the fourth amendment too
broadly, and rolled back the amendment's protections by limit-
ing them solely to privacy interests. In Rakas v. Illinois,33 the
granted Jones standing based on the fact that Jones was "legitimately on [the]
premises" when the search took place. Id. at 267.
Simien notes that commentators disagree over whether, with this alterna-
tive holding, the Jones Court merely expanded the class of property interests
protected by the fourth amendment or whether the Court recognized a new
type of interests, privacy interests, that were entitled to fourth amendment
protections. Simien, supra note 20, at 499. Simien concludes the Court did
both. Id. at 499-500.
32. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967). The Court
held in Katz that the government violated the fourth amendment when it elec-
tronically eavesdropped on the defendant's side of a telephone conversation in
a public telephone booth. The Court maintained:
[W]e have expressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs not
only seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of
oral statements, overheard without any "technical trespass under...
local property law." Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is
recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people - and not
simply "areas" - against unreasonable searches and seizures, it be-
comes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.
Id. at 353 (citation omitted).
Declining to frame the issue as whether the telephone booth was a "con-
stitutionally protected area," the Katz Court considered whether the caller's
expectation of privacy from governmental intrusion was "reasonable." Id. at
351-52. The Court recognized that the fourth amendment also protects prop-
erty interests, however, in its statement that the amendment "protects individ-
ual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections
go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all." Id. at 350.
Writing separately, Justice Harlan theorized that in order to demonstrate
a fourth amendment interest via a "reasonable expectation of privacy," a de-
fendant must satisfy a twofold requirement: (1) an actual expectation of pri-
vacy in the area searched, and (2) a finding by the court that this expectation
is reasonable. Id. at 361. Justice Harlan wrote:
As the Court's opinion states, "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." The question, however, is what protection it af-
fords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question
requires reference to a "place." My understanding of the rule that
has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold require-
ment, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, the defendants were passengers in a car
in which police found a rifle and ammunition used in an armed robbery. Id. at
130. The defendants challenged the search, but did not assert a property or
privacy interest in either the searched automobile or the seized items. Id. In-
stead, they argued that the alternative Jones "legitimately on the premises
1262 [Vol. 75:1255
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Court held that the sole standard for determining whether the
government violated the fourth amendment was whether it vio-
lated the defendant's "legitimate expectation of privacy."' 4
Under this test, a defendant was required to show that the gov-
ernment violated an expectation of privacy subjectively held by
the defendant that the Court was willing to find objectively "le-
gitimate."-a Although the Rakas Court did not completely
abandon the notion that possession is sufficient by itself to chal-
lenge government conduct,36 the Court in Rawlings v. -Ken-
test" provided them with fourth amendment standing, as they were legiti-
mately on the premises during the search. Id. at 132; cf. Jones, 362 U.S. at 267.
The Court rejected the alternative Jones test as "overbroad," and theorized
that "the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the extent of a particular de-
fendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoreti-
cally separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing." Rakas, 439
U.S. at 139. The Court thus found that the two questions merged into one:
"whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the de-
fendant which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect." Id. at 140.
Despite this reformulation, for the sake of convenience this Note continues to
address the question of whether the defendant has a protected interest in a
searched or seized item as one involving "standing."
34. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143. The Rakas Court cited Katz as the primary
source of this new test. Id. But see Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the
"Legitimate Expectation of Privacy," 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1298-99 (1981)
(arguing that "[a]lthough commentators credit Katz with having clearly estab-
lished the shift from a property to a privacy model of the fourth amendment,
the privacy concept actually has a more detailed and complex history"); id. at
1298-1302 (citing cases).
35. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143-44 n.12. Writing separately, Justice Powell cited
Justice Harlan's twofold "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard and at-
tempted to identify some of the factors the Court would consider in determin-
ing whether a particular defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy: (1)
whether the defendant took normal precautions to maintain his privacy; (2)
the way the defendant used the location; (3) whether the particular type of
government intrusion has historically been perceived to be objectionable; and
(4) whether the defendant had a common-law property interest invaded by the
search or seizure. Id. at 151-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
36. The majority was careful to stipulate that "a 'legitimate' expectation
of privacy by definition means more than a subjective expectation of not being
discovered." 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. The Court required that the defendant's
subjective expectation be "one which the law recognizes as 'legitimate,"' and
referred to "concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society" as the proper sources of legiti-
macy. Id. Thus, on the one hand, the Court "adher[ed] to the view expressed
in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions developed in prop-
erty and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like ought not to
control," and stressed that "[e]xpectations of privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment ... need not be based on a common-law interest in real or per-
sonal property, or on the invasion of such an interest." Id. at 143 & n.12. On
the other hand, the Court maintained that in determining whether a subjec-
tive expectation is legitimate, "the Court has not altogether abandoned use of
1991] 1263
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tucky 37 expressly limited the fourth amendment's protections
to privacy. The Rawlings Court held that a defendant's prop-
erty interest in seized contraband is insufficient by itself for a
fourth amendment claim,3 8 unless the property interest also
property concepts in determining the presence or absence of the privacy inter-
ests protected by that Amendment." Id. at 143 n.12.
The majority gave conflicting signals regarding whether a possessory in-
terest alone generates a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in an item. The
Court implied that had the defendants demonstrated a property interest in the
seized evidence, they would have had standing to contest the search. Id. at 142
n.11 (maintaining "[t]his is not to say that such [defendants] could not contest
the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search if their own property
were seized"). Nevertheless, the majority speculated that "even a property in-
terest in premises may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of
privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises or activity
conducted thereon." Id. at 143-44 n.12.
37. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). In Rawlings, the defendant was charged with un-
lawfully possessing narcotics found in his companion's purse. Id. at 100-01.
Police officers had ordered Rawlings's companion, Cox, to empty the contents
of her purse. Cox complied, extracting several items including a jar containing
LSD and number of smaller vials containing other illegal drugs. After empty-
ing the purse, Cox turned to Rawlings and told him to "take what was his."
Rawlings immediately claimed ownership of the contraband, and was arrested
and charged with possession with intent to sell the various controlled sub-
stances. Id. at 101.
The defendant challenged the legality of the search, arguing that because
he had both ownership and possessory interests in the drugs, he had standing
to invoke the fourth amendment. Id. at 105-06. The majority rejected the de-
fendant's argument, holding that an ownership or possessory interest in items
seized pursuant to a search is insufficient by itself to render the search or
seizure unreasonable for fourth amendment purposes. Id. The majority noted
that the defendant had testified that he had no subjective expectation of pri-
vacy in the purse. Id. at 104 n.3. The Justices further observed that Rawlings
had only known Cox for a few days, had not kept any personal items in the
purse before the day of the search, and had no right to exclude others from
the purse. Moreover, other persons had access to the purse, and Rawlings
placed the items in the purse with little or no discussion with Cox. The Court
found that under these circumstances, "the precipitous nature of the transac-
tion hardly supports a reasonable inference that [Rawlings] took normal pre-
cautions to maintain his privacy." Id. at 105. Because Rawlings could not
present other factors showing a legitimate expectation of privacy, his fourth
amendment challenge was rejected. Id. at 106.
38. As support for its holding that only privacy interests are protected by
the fourth amendment, the majority cited the Court's opinion in Rakas, where
it maintained that "arcane" property law concepts should not control fourth
amendment analysis. Id. at 105. Ironically, in making this statement, the
Rakas majority was attempting to assure the Rakas dissenters that fourth
amendment protections would not be limited to those who owned or possessed
property. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149-50 n.17. The Rakas majority had insisted that
because the Rakas defendants "asserted neither a property nor a possessory in-
terest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized," they could
not challenge the search and seizure. Id. at 148 (emphasis added); cf. Rawl-
ings, 448 U.S. at 114-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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generates a "legitimate expectation of privacy."39
This shift in fourth amendment analysis was applied to
possession cases in United States v. Salvucci,40 the companion
case to Rawlings, in which the Court discarded the Jones auto-
matic standing exception for possessory crimes defendants.
4 1
The Saivucci Court reasoned that after Rawlings, the govern-
ment could now argue without contradiction that the defendant
illegally possessed the seized good, but nevertheless was not
subjected to a fourth amendment deprivation, because the de-
fendant had no "legitimate expectation of privacy" violated by
the search that led to the seizure.42 The majority further con-
cluded that the Court's holding in Simmons v. United States,4 3
39. In Rawlings, the Court appeared to recognize that the challenged con-
duct involved two acts: a search of a purse belonging to the defendant's ac-
quaintance, and a seizure of contraband, belonging to the defendant, found in
the purse. 448 U.S. at 105-06. Rather than allow the defendant to contest only
the seizure, based on his possessory interest in the seized item, but not the
search, as he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse, the Rawl-
ings Court found that "the two inquiries merge into one: whether governmen-
tal officials violated any legitimate expectation of privacy held by petitioner."
Id. at 106. The Court thus sharply restricted the amendment's protections by
fashioning a "neo-trespass doctrine" that limits fourth amendment challenges
to persons whose privacy interests, rather than property interests, are
infringed.
40. 448 U.S. 83 (1980). The defendant, Salvucci, was charged with possess-
ing stolen mail found by police during a search of a third party's apartment.
Id. at 85. The defendant relied on automatic standing to contest the search
and seizure. Id. The government appealed after the trial court granted the de-
fendant's motion to suppress, and the appellate court affirmed. Id.
41. Id. at 95.
42. Id at 91-93 (noting that after Rawlings, "legal possession in a seized
good is not a proxy for determining whether the owner had a Fourth Amend-
ment interest").
43. 390 U.S. 377 (1968). In Simmons, a defendant charged with armed
robbery made incriminating statements at a suppression hearing while at-
tempting to establish standing to challenge a search and seizure. Id. at 381.
The defendant's statements were later admitted on the issue of guilt in de-
fendant's trial, and the defendant was convicted. Id. Although recognizing
that Jones removed the need for possessory crimes defendants to establish
standing to challenge searches, the Court noted that "there will be occasions,
even in prosecutions for nonpossessory offenses, when a defendant's testimony
will be needed to establish standing." Id. at 390. The Court further observed
that "[t]he only, or at least the most natural, way in which [defendant] could
have found standing to object to the admission of the suitcase was to testify
that he was its owner," and that admission of this testimony at trial was highly
prejudicial to defendant's case. Id. at 391. The Court reasoned that if pre-trial
testimony were admissible at trial, defendants would be deterred from assert-
ing their fourth amendment rights, especially in "marginal" cases where the
defendant has a substantial fourth amendment claim but still isn't sure his
motion to suppress will succeed. Id. at 392-93. Finding this situation "intolera-
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which prohibits the prosecution from using a defendant's sup-
pression-hearing testimony in its case-in-chief, adequately re-
solved the Jones "self-incrimination dilemma."44 In short, the
Court overruled the Jones automatic standing rule in favor of
the Rakas "legitimate expectation of privacy" test for posses-
sory crimes defendants.45
The significance of the Supreme Court's new interpretation
for possessory crimes defendants can be illustrated by contrast-
ing the application of Jones and Salvucci to the hypothetical in
the introduction. Under Jones, because Smith is charged with
possessing amphetamines at the time they were seized in a po-
lice search, she would be granted automatic standing at the pre-
trial hearing to challenge the search and seizure as unreasona-
ble. Because Officer Brown did not have probable cause to
search the trunk of the automobile, a court would likely find
that he violated Smith's fourth amendment rights and would
suppress the pills as evidence. With no other evidence against
Smith, the possession charge against her probably would be
dismissed.
After Rawlings and Salvucci, however, Smith is required
to show that Officer Brown's search and seizure violated her le-
gitimate expectation of privacy. Consequently, the prosecutor
can argue that Smith had no legitimate expectation of privacy
in the automobile because she was not using the car for her
own purposes.46 If Smith attempts to establish a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy by testifying she owned other items found
in the automobile, she might (or might not) demonstrate an ex-
ble," the Court held that a defendant's suppression hearing testimony may not
be admitted against him on the issue of guilt. Id. at 394.
44. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text (discussing the Jones
Court's conclusion that requiring a possessory crimes defendant to testify at a
pre-trial hearing forces him to admit to an essential element of his alleged
crime). The Salvucci majority argued that the protection offered by Simmons
was even broader than the Jones automatic standing remedy, as it covered de-
fendants in both possession and non-possession cases. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 90.
Nonetheless, the Court echoed the Rakas majority's statement that Jones "cre-
ates too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth Amendment rights," and
that automatic standing "serves only to afford a windfall to defendants whose
Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated." Id at 92-93, 95 (emphasis
in original).
45. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 94-95.
46. See State v. Robinson, 458 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that a possessory crimes defendant had no legitimate expectation of
privacy in an automobile, as "his driving of the car was a single-instance use of
the car," and "[h]e was not using the car for his own purposes, but was trans-
porting the car to the owner"), review denied (Sept. 14, 1990).
1266 [Vol. 75:1255
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION
pectation of privacy sufficient for fourth amendment stand-
ing.47 If her showing is insufficient, however, or if the court
grants standing but finds the search and seizure nonetheless
reasonable, the motion to suppress will fail and the pills will be
admitted as evidence.48 Moreover, the prosecutor may intro-
duce Smith's testimony that she owned other items in the car
as impeachment if Smith testifies differently at trial.49
Many states find the defendant unfairly disadvantaged
under these circumstances. Accordingly, these states reject the
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth
amendment and turn to their state constitutions for guidance.
B. STATE COURT REACTION TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATIONS
As the Burger Court reformulated the Warren Court's
fourth amendment interpretations,50 state courts questioning
the Court's analysis used their state constitutions for authority
to provide more expansive protections against searches and
seizures. 5 ' The courts usually employed a two-step approach.
47. See id. (noting that the defendant "made no claim that he had any
possessions of his own in the car").
48. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (recounting the Court's
requirement that the defendant show she has a protected interest before chal-
lenging the search or seizure, as well as the unreasonableness of the search or
seizure, to suppress the unlawfully-obtained item as evidence).
49. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota
rules allowing pre-trial testimony to be used against the defendant as
impeachment).
50. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Burger
Court's retrenchment in the area of fourth amendment standing).
51. The United States Supreme Court has long held that a state court's
decision is not reviewable by a federal court if made on independent and ade-
quate state grounds. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S.
74, 81 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Cooper v. California, 386
U.S. 58, 62 (1967); see also Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitu-
tions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141,1156-
57 (1985) (noting general acceptance of state power to interpret its own consti-
tution more broadly); Fleming & Nordby, The Minnesota Bill of Rights:
"Wrapt in the Old Miasmal Mis4" 7 HAmLUEm L. REV. 51, 51-53 nn.1-2 (1984)
(observing that the Minnesota Supreme Court recognizes that states may in-
terpret their own constitutions more broadly, and counting 32 other states that
have interpreted their own constitutions more expansively); Greenhalgh, In-
dependent and Adequate State Grounds: The Long and the Short of It, in RE-
CENT DEvELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNSTITUrIoNAL LAw 15, 15-64 (P. Barmberger
ed. 1985) (discussing generally the states' reliance on state constitutions to
maintain safeguards in criminal procedure); Utter, State Constitutional Law,
The United States Supreme Cour4 and Democratic Accountability: Is There a
Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 27 (1989) (reporting "more
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First, citing one or more of the shortcomings in the Supreme
Court's current interpretation of the fourth amendment, the
courts concluded that the Supreme Court's "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" standard provides insufficient protection
against government abuses.5 2 Having reached this conclusion,
the courts then interpreted their state constitutions broadly to
provide greater opportunity for possessory crimes defendants to
challenge unreasonable searches and seizures.5 3
In reaching their decisions, these courts rejected the "legit-
imate expectation of privacy" approach. Instead, they usually
interpreted their state constitutions to provide that an owner-
than 450 published state court opinions interpret[ing] state constitutions as go-
ing beyond federal constitutional guarantees").
52. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing various state
court opinions criticizing the United States Supreme Court's "legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy" test).
53. Eight state courts have retained automatic standing via their state con-
stitutions: State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202, 1205 (La. 1984); Commonwealth v.
Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 600-01, 550 N.E.2d 121, 125-26 (1990); State v. Settle,
122 N.H. 214, 218, 447 A.2d 1284, 1286 (1982); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228,
440 A.2d 1311, 1319 (1981); People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514, 518-19, 508 N.E.2d
903, 905, 516 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170-71 (1987); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 66,
470 A.2d 457, 468 (1983); State v. Wood, 148 Vt. 479, 489, 536 A.2d 902, 908
(1987); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 180-81, 622 P.2d 1199, 1206 (1980).
In a ninth case, State v. Simons, 86 Or. App. 34, 38-39, 738 P.2d 590, 592
review denied, 304 Or. 437, 746 P.2d 1166 (1987), the Oregon Court of Appeals
adopted automatic standing as a matter of state constitutional law. Although
the Oregon Supreme Court has not yet expressly adopted automatic standing,
it has largely rejected the United States Supreme Court's "legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy" test. See, e.g., State v. Tanner, 304 Or. 312, 321 n.7, 745 P.2d
757, 762 n.7 (1987) (noting that the Oregon Constitution protects substantive
rights, rather than expectations of privacy). Moreover, besides denying review
in Simons, the state supreme court denied standing to a defendant who chal-
lenged a search and seizure that took place before he possessed the contra-
band, on the ground that the defendant had no privacy or property right in the
item at the time of the search and seizure. See State v. Kosta, 304 Or. 549, 553-
54, 748 P.2d 72, 75 (1987). This is consistent with the automatic standing rule,
which provides standing only to those defendants accused of illegally possess-
ing an item at the time of the contested search or seizure. See Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1973); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
263-65 (1960).
Despite these developments, there is still some confusion over whether
Oregon has retained the automatic standing rule. For example, in State v. Mc-
Donald, 105 Or. App. 102, 105, 803 P.2d 1211, 1213 (1990), the Oregon Court of
Appeals held that a possessory crimes defendant who threw a bindle out of an
automobile window during a high-speed chase had no standing to contest the
subsequent seizure of cocaine found inside. Rather than consider whether the
defendant remained in constructive possession of the contraband at the time of
the search and seizure, the court implied that automatic standing was no
longer available in Oregon. See id. at 104, 803 P.2d at 1212 (stating that
Simons "is no longer controlling in light of Kosta").
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ship, possessory, or participatory interest in the searched or
seized object is sufficient for standing to challenge the govern-
ment's conduct.-4 Under this approach, the state courts criti-
cized the "legitimate expectation of privacy test" as vague,5
overly narrow,ss or contrary to the plain meaning or purpose of
the search and seizure provision in the state constitution.5 7 Dis-
54. See, e.g., Alston, 88 N.J. at 227-28, 440 A.2d at 1319; Sell, 504 Pa. at 67,
470 A.2d at 469; Wood, 148 Vt. at 489-90, 536 A.2d at 908-09. For a more thor-
ough discussion of state court opinions adopting automatic standing via their
state constitutions, see generally Comment, Standing to Challenge Searches
and Seizures: A Small Group of States Chart Their Own Course, 63 TEMPLE L.
REV. 559, 570-81 (1990) (discussing state courts' reliance on state constitutional
provisions in rejecting the "legitimate expectation of privacy" test and retain-
ing automatic standing).
55. See, e.g., Alston, 88 N.J. at 226, 440 A.2d at 1319 (citation omitted) (crit-
icizing the Rakas standard as vague, and subject "to the potential for inconsis-
tent and capricious application"); see also Ashdown, supra note 34, at 1310,
1329-41 (maintaining that "the lack of clarity and predictability inherent in the
inquiry of which privacy expectations are constitutionally legitimate leaves the
police and the courts without standards to guide their conduct and decisions;
this uncertainty, in turn, further exacerbates the diminished protection avail-
able to complainants under the Supreme Court's view of fourth amendment
privacy"); see also Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The
Scope of the Protection, 79 J. CRiM. L. & CRumINOLOGY 1105, 1165-66 (1989)
(noting various ambiguities in the "expectation of privacy" standard); W.
LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 11.3 (Supp. 1986).
56. See, e.g., Sell, 504 Pa. at 66-67, 470 A.2d at 468 (finding the United
States Supreme Court's reasons for abandoning automatic standing "unpersua-
sive," and maintaining that the Supreme Court's use of the "legitimate expec-
tation of privacy" standard "needlessly detracts from the critical element of
unreasonable governmental intrusion").
57. See, e.g., Sell, 504 Pa. at 66, 470 A.2d at 468 (adherence to "legitimate
expectation of privacy" test would "undermine the clear language" of the state
constitution); Wood, 148 Vt. at 487-88, 536 A.2d at 907-08 (noting that the state
judiciary is responsible for preserving the "unalienable" rights retained by the
people in the state constitution, and that the Rakeas test frustrates judicial re-
view of governmental abuses by misplacing the focus on the defendant's ability
to challenge a search or seizure, rather than on the search or seizure itself).
Commentators also argue that the majority's restriction of fourth amend-
ment protections to privacy interests is contrary to the historical underpin-
nings of the amendment. See supra note 20 (citing commentators noting that
the fourth amendment was a response to English writs of assistance, which
were used to search for and seize contraband).
Courts and commentators also maintain that the Rawlings/Salvucci for-
mulation contradicts a wide body of cases finding property rights protected by
the fourth amendment. For example, the Alston court found Rawlings to be
contrary to the "authoritative precedents and policies underlying the law of
searches and seizures." Alston, 88 N.J. at 227, 440 A.2d at 1319 (citations omit-
ted); see also Ashdown, supra note 34, at 1321-29 (arguing that by renouncing
property interests as protected by the fourth amendment, the Court ignored
the plain language of the amendment and the Court's own precedents);
Simien, supra note 20, at 509 (noting that "[o]ne of the most troubling points
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carding the federal standard for cases arising under the state
criminal code, they focused on the defendant's relationship to
the property searched or seized, rather than any privacy inter-
est in the property, to determine whether the defendant can
challenge the government's conduct.58 Thus, the state courts
argued that when the state accuses the defendant of illegally
possessing a seized item, the state effectively concedes that the
defendant has a substantial relationship to the item. Because of
this implied admission, these courts reasoned that defendants
should be granted automatic standing to contest the search and
seizure.59
Other approaches provided automatic standing by focusing
more closely on the legitimate expectation of privacy test's
shortcomings,60 or by emphasizing the incomplete protection
Simmons provides possessory crimes defendants, 61 without con-
with the Rakas progeny is that the Court rewrote the fourth amendment and
in doing so struck the amendment's protections of papers and effects right out
of the Constitution").
In Katz, the Supreme Court noted that "the Fourth Amendment cannot
be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.' That Amendment
protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion,
but its intrusions go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all."
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (emphasis added); see also
Ashdown, supra note 34, at 1310, 1323 (maintaining that the "legitimate expec-
tation of privacy" standard "is at best confusing and at worst exhibits infidelity
to the privacy notions expressed in Katz," and observing that "[i]ndeed, the
Court made it clear that it did not intend to disavow property interests in
[Katz]").
58. These courts reject the "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard as
a basis for conferring standing under their state constitutions, regardless of
whether the defendant is accused of unlawful possession. The main inquiry is
thus whether the defendant had an ownership, possessory, or participatory in-
terest in the searched or seized item. See State v. Wood, 148 Vt. 479, 489, 536
A.2d 902, 908 (1987).
59. See State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228, 440 A.2d at 1311, 1320 (1981) (find-
ing that the automatic standing rule is justified "in pretrial proceedings involv-
ing possessory offenses, where the charge itself alleges an interest sufficient to
support a fourth amendment claim"); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 66-67,
470 A.2d 457, 469 (1983) (holding that because a property interest in searched
or seized property is sufficient for standing, "it necessarily follows that a per-
son charged with a possessory offense must be accorded automatic standing" to
challenge a search or seizure).
60. See, e.g., State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214, 219, 447 A.2d 1284, 1287 (1982)
(noting that the "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard "is no boon to
the general administration of [the] criminal justice system," as it is vague,
leads to inconsistent results, and provides insufficient guidance to police
officers).
61. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 179-80 nn.2-3, 622 P.2d
1199, 1205-06 nn.2-3 (1980) (noting that under Harris, Havens, and Washington
court rules, a defendant's suppression hearing testimony might be used against
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sidering whether property interests are protected by state con-
stitutional provisions. Yet another approach relaxed the
prohibition on "third-party" standing 2 by allowing any person
against whom the state offers evidence to challenge the search
and seizure leading to the discovery of the evidence.63 Under
all of these approaches, the courts construed the search and
seizure provisions of their state constitutions to provide greater
protection than the fourth amendment because they recognized
the deficiencies in the United States Supreme Court's current
interpretation of fourth amendment protections.
C. MINNESOTA'S REACTION TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATIONS
Like most other states,64 Minnesota has followed the
United States Supreme Court's recent fourth amendment inter-
pretations in virtual lock-step fashion. Like all other state
courts, Minnesota courts adhere to the exclusionary rule.65
Minnesota courts also have followed the United States
Supreme Court's expansion and restriction of fourth amend-
him at trial as impeachment); Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 600,
550 N.E.2d 121, 125 (1990) (recognizing that "the principal concerns of the
Jones Court remain valid today, despite the current Supreme Court's shift in
thinking").
62. See supra note 24 (noting the United States Supreme Court tradition-
ally requires that the defendant show she was the victim of the fourth amend-
ment violation, rather than vicariously assert another's fourth amendment
rights).
63. See State v. Owen, 453 So. 2d 1202, 1204-05 (La. 1984). Under yet an-
other approach, New York grants automatic standing when the state imputes
possession to the defendant on the basis of a statutory presumption. See Peo-
ple v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514, 519, 508 N.E.2d 903, 905, 516 N.Y.S.2d 168, 170
(1987) (holding that the state "may not predicate defendant's guilt solely on
the constructive possession of the weapon attributed to him as a passenger...
and simultaneously deprive him of the right to challenge the search"). Rather
than rely solely on the New York Constitution, the court retained automatic
standing as a matter of both federal and state law. Id. at 519, 508 N.E.2d at
906, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
64. See Comment, supra note 54, at 572 (noting that "[s]ince the Supreme
Court revised its standing analysis a decade ago, forty-two states have followed
the Supreme Court's analysis"). Since those words were written, a ninth state,
Massachusetts, has rejected the United States Supreme Court's approach and
retained automatic standing for possessory crimes defendants. See Amendola,
406 Mass. at 592, 550 N.E.2d at 126 (granting automatic standing under the
state constitution).
65. See State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 263-65, 121 N.W.2d 327, 330-32 (not-
ing that Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) made the federal rule excluding all




ment protections over the last thirty years.66 In none of these
cases has the Minnesota Supreme Court considered whether
the Minnesota Constitution independently protects individual
privacy or property against intrusive governmental conduct.67
Nor has the court considered whether the Simmons rule ade-
quately resolves the Jones self-incrimination dilemma-ca
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledges
that article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution may pro-
vide greater protection than the fourth amendment,6 9 the court
has not yet decided whether the state constitution provides pos-
sessory crimes defendants with automatic standing to contest
66. Minnesota courts implemented the Jones rule granting persons
charged with possessory crimes automatic standing to challenge searches and
seizures, as indicated by contemporary literature regarding criminal procedure
in the state. See, e.g., MINNESOTA PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE, MINNESOTA
AND FEDERAL CRIINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 1966, at 41 (1966) (noting that
under Jones, possessory crimes defendants are entitled to standing to object to
searches and seizures). The Minnesota Supreme Court followed the United
States Supreme Court's expansion of fourth amendment protections under
Katz in State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970), where the court
held that evidence of consensual sodomy obtained by secretly spying on a de-
fendant in a public restroom violated the defendant's reasonable expectation
of privacy. Id. at 208, 177 N.W.2d at 802. The Minnesota Supreme Court ad-
hered to the Rakas Court's fourth amendment interpretation in State v. Tun-
gland, 281 N.W.2d 646 (Minn. 1979), when the court held that because the
defendant had not shown a property interest in the premises searched or the
items seized, nor a legitimate expectation of privacy, he was not entitled to
challenge the government's conduct. Id at 649-50. Finally, in State v. Guy, 298
N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1980), the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the Rawlings
and Salvucci opinions interpreting the fourth amendment as protecting only
privacy interests, and discarded the automatic standing rule for possessory
crimes defendants. Id. at 45.
67. See Comment, supra note 54, at 572 n.119 (citing State v. Kumpula,
355 N.W.2d 697, 701 (Minn. 1984), and State v. Christenson, 371 N.W.2d 228,
232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), for the proposition that Minnesota courts have im-
plemented the "legitimate expectation of privacy" approach without indicating
whether the test is required under both the state and federal constitutions).
68. See infra notes 152-61 and accompanying text (examining Minnesota
rules allowing pre-trial testimony to be used against a defendant later at trial
as impeachment). The court has not considered the effectiveness of the Sim-
mons rule despite its earlier recognition of the Jones self-incrimination di-
lemma in State v. Thompson, 273 Minn. 1, 23, 139 N.W.2d 490, 507, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966). Subsequent court opinions have been silent on the issue,
with the exception of Christenson, 371 N.W.2d at 232 (observing that
"[t]estimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to suppress cannot be
admitted as evidence of guilt at trial and can be used only for impeachment
purposes, if at all").
69. See O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 404 (Minn. 1979); see also
State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985) (observing that "[i]t is axio-
matic that a state supreme court may interpret its own constitution to offer
greater protection of individual rights than does the federal constitution").
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searches and seizures.70 Thus, whether the Minnesota Consti-
tution provides automatic standing to possessory crimes defend-
ants is still an open question.
H. CRITERIA USED BY MINNESOTA COURTS TO




A. FACTORS APPLIED BY MINNESOTA COURTS TO DETERmiNE
WHETHER THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION PROVIDES
BROADER PROTECTION THAN THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
Although generally accepting that the Minnesota Supreme
Court may interpret a Minnesota constitutional provision dif-
ferently than a parallel federal constitutional provision,71 both
courts72 and commentators73 acknowledge that the state court
70. In State v. Willis, 320 N.W.2d 726 (Minn. 1982), the state supreme
court refused to consider the defendant's contention that the court should
adopt automatic standing as a matter of state law, on the ground that even if
the defendant had standing, the challenged search was reasonable. Id. at 727.
The court wrote:
[Defendant] contends that the automatic standing rule should be re-
tained as a matter of state law. We see no need to even consider this
issue because we are satisfied that even if defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area under the seat, his Fourth Amend-
ment rights were not violated ....
Id. Subsequent state supreme court opinions have analyzed search and seizure
challenges under the federal "legitimate expectation of privacy" test only. See,
e.g., State v. Olson, 436 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Minn. 1989), alff'd, 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990);
State v. Brown, 345 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn. 1984).
71. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (recognizing general accept-
ance of the notion that state courts may interpret state constitutional provi-
sions differently than federal constitutional provisions).
72. See, e.g., Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 726 (noting that although "[s]tate courts
are, and should be, the first line of defense for individual liberties within the
federalist system[,] [t]his, of course, does not mean that we will or should cava-
lierly construe our constitution more expansively than the United States
Supreme Court has construed the federal constitution" (footnote omitted)); see
also State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 60, 720 P.2d 808, 811-12 (1986) (main-
taining that many of the courts relying on their state constitutions inade-
quately explain their decisions).
73. See Abrahamson, supra note 51, at 1176 (maintaining that, when inter-
preting a parallel provision differently, it is important for the state court to
explain why the United States Supreme Court's reasoning is not persuasive);
Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 63 (observing that "[m]uch criticism has
been directed at result-oriented use of state constitutions which 'establish[es]
no principled basis for repudiating federal precedent and, accordingly, fur-
nish[es] no basis for predicting the future course of decisional law"' (quoting
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should not do so lightly. The state court should explain in its
opinion why it considers the federal interpretation unpersua-
sive and give appropriate weight to precedent and the policies
underlying the constitutional right at issue.74 More impor-
tantly, to provide guidance to state citizens and government
agents, the court should develop objective standards for deter-
mining whether a state constitutional provision should be inter-
preted differently than its federal counterpart. 75
Like many other states,76 the Minnesota Supreme Court
has articulated several objective factors for determining
whether to interpret a state constitutional provision differently
than a parallel federal constitutional provision:77
Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor - Judicial Review Under
the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CoNsT. L.Q. 975, 989 (1979))).
74. See Abrahamson, supra note 51, at 1176; Brennan, State Constitutions
and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977).
75. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 63-66.
76. See, e.g., Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13, where the
Washington Supreme Court articulated six criteria relevant to whether, in a
particular case, a state constitutional provision should be interpreted more ex-
pansively than a parallel provision in the United States Constitution: (1) the
textual language of the state constitutional provision; (2) significant differ-
ences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions;
(3) differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions; (4)
state constitutional and common law history; (5) pre-existing state law; and (6)
matters of particular state interest or local concern. 1d.; see also State v.
Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 164, 519 A.2d 820, 860 (1987) (Handler, J., concurring)
(noting previous New Jersey Supreme Court opinions relying on legal tradi-
tions, state constitutional history, and public policy considerations in deciding
whether to interpret a state constitutional provision more broadly than a par-
allel federal constitutional provision); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296,
302-04, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907, 911 (1986) (focusing on differ-
ences in text, structure, and historical underpinnings between the two consti-
tutions, as well as whether there is "a judicial perception of sound policy,
justice and fundamental fairness" to be advanced by construing the state pro-
vision differently), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987); State v..Flores, 280 Or.
273, 279-80, 570 P.2d 965, 968 (1977) (finding that relevant criteria are similari-
ties between the state and federal constitutions, relevant state precedents,
unique local conditions, positions taken by the United States Supreme Court
and a possible need for national uniformity).
Commentators support the multi-factored approach to state constitutional
interpretation. See, e.g., Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 71-77 (suggesting
that several factors are relevant, inter alia: (1) the textual language of the
parallel provisions; (2) state constitutional history; (3) Minnesota precedent
(i.e., state common law); and (4) matters of unique or local concern); see also
Abrahamson, supra note 51, at 1182 (noting that several state courts departing
from federal precedent consider "the state constitutional language, the state
consitutional history, English and American common law, prior state case law,
and the historical development of federal and state doctrine").
77. See Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 455 N.W.2d 93, 96
(Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (noting the Minnesota Supreme Court's reliance on ob-
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(1) whether textual similarities between the state and
federal provisions reflect the framers' intent that
the two provisions be interpreted similarly;78
(2) whether Minnesota's constitutional and common
law history indicate that a different interpretation
is appropriate;79
(3) whether existing state law defines the scope of the
state consitutional provision;80 and
(4) whether matters of particular state interest or lo-
cal concern justify a different interpretation.81
An analysis of cases applying these factors sheds some light on
the policies undergirding each factor, the scope of the factor,
and the factor's relevance to whether the Minnesota Supreme
Court should interpret article I, section 10 of the state constitu-
tion more broadly than the federal fourth amendment.
B. CASES APPLYING FACTORS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION PROVIDES BROADER
PROTECTION THAN THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
1. Textual Similarities Between Parallel State and Federal
Constitutional Provisions
When evaluating a state constitutional claim, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court often considers whether textual similari-
ties between parallel state and federal provisions provide a
jective factors when deciding whether to construe a state constitutional provi-
sion more broadly than its federal counterpart).
78. See State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. 1985) (noting that "a
decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting a comparable provi-
sion of the federal constitution that... is textually identical to a provision of
our constitution, is of inherently persuasive, although not necessarily compel-
ling, force").
79. See State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382-86 (Minn. 1988) (analyzing ju-
risprudence under the territorial laws and declining to overrule over 700 years
of English and American common law history in holding that the drafters of
the state constitution assumed that a jury meant a body of 12 persons).
80. See State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904-05 (Minn. 1983) (noting
that "regardless of federal constitutional underpinnings, Minnesota law has es-
tablished a broad-based right to counsel which goes beyond the dictates of
[United States Supreme Court decisions]").
81. See State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 771 (Minn. 1986) (in reaching its
decision that a defendant's confession to his probation officer is admissible
under the self-incrimination provision of the Minnesota Constitution, the
court considered "whether the unique relationship between probationer and
probation officer as seen in the light of the philosophy of the Minnesota crimi-
nal justice system requires us to adopt a view contrary to that expressed by
the United States Supreme Court").
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basis for interpreting the Minnesota constitutional provision in
the same fashion as its federal counterpart.8 2 Adherence to this
factor presumably helps to fulfill the original intent of the state
constitution's framers, as well as to achieve consistency in deci-
sion-making.8 3 By enacting a state constitutional provision tex-
tually identical to its federal counterpart, the framers may have
intended the two provisions to be interpreted similarly.84 Such
a presumption is not controlling, however, and a United States
Supreme Court interpretation of a federal provision need not
apply automatically to an identical state provision.as
82. See, e.g., Fuller, 374 N.W.2d at 727; Murphy, 380 N.W.2d at 771.
83. See Keyser, State Constitutions and Theories of Judicial Review:
Some Variations on a Theme, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1051, 1063 (1985). Keyser ex-
plains the "artificial canon of construction that identical language ... should
be read identically" as our "concern for consistency [which] outweighs our in-
terest as judges in arriving at the 'true meaning' of the language." Id. Keyser
also maintains that the canon "signal[s] to framers of future state constitutions
that, if they wish to broaden rights under the state constitution beyond those
guaranteed by the federal constitution, they must make that purpose clear
within the text itself." Id. at 1064; cf. Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note
73, at 991 (arguing that because California's constitutional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures are identical to federal guarantees, they
"were derived directly from the Federal Constitution, and, therefore, offer no
apparent basis for... divergent interpretation"); Van de Kamp & Gerry, Re-
forming the Exclusionary Rule: An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to
the California Constitution, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1109, 1118-19 (1982) (questioning
whether, in several California Supreme Court cases construing state constitu-
tional provisions more broadly than their federal counterparts, the courts at-
tempted to discern the intent of the drafters).
84. This notion underlies the canon of statutory interpretation that a stat-
ute borrowed from another jurisdiction should be interpreted consistently
with the other jurisdiction's construction. See, e.g., Ewers v. Thunderbird Avi-
ation, Inc., 289 N.W.2d 94, 99 n.6 (Minn. 1979) (recognizing that "where a con-
stitutional or statutory provision is taken from another state . . . the
construction placed upon it by the court of that state is presumed to be
adopted with the provision"); see also Zerbe v. State, 583 P.2d 845, 846 (Alaska
1978) (noting that "the settled interpretations of the highest court of the other
jurisdiction ... are presumptively intended by the lawmaker to be adopted
with the statute"). This theory, however, has less force with regard to the
other state's interpretations made after the second state has adopted the paral-
lel provision. See State v. Ritschel, 220 Minn. 578, 586, 20 N.W.2d 673, 677
(1945) (stressing that the adopting state is not bound to follow decisions made
by the other state after the provision has been adopted).
85. See, e.g., People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113,
119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329 (1975). In Brisendine, the California Supreme Court
maintained:
It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions
textually identical to the Bill of Rights were intended to mirror their
federal counterparts. The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of
Rights was based upon the corresponding provisions of the first state
constitutions, rather than the reverse.
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When deciding whether to construe a state constitutional
provision differently than an identical federal constitutional
provision, the Minnesota Supreme Court considers a United
States Supreme Court interpretation of the federal provision to
be persuasive, but not binding, precedent.8 6 In such cases, the
United States Supreme Court interpretation will not be applied
if any one of the other three factors set forth above 87 indicates
that a different interpretation is appropriate.88 When refusing
to follow a Supreme Court interpretation that undermines a
state constitutional right, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaf-
firms not only the independence of the state constitution, but
also its own role as the guardian of these rights for Min-
nesotans.8 9 Thus, although the Minnesota Supreme Court
should presume the "legitimate expectation of privacy" test is
Id. at 550, 531 P.2d at 113, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329; see also Zerbe, 583 P.2d at 847
(recognizing that "the presumption [that the legislature intended for a bor-
rowed provision to conform with the other state's construction] is, in any
event, not conclusive," and declaring that "[i]t is conceivable, indeed likely,
that if a precedent underlying an adopted statute were no longer vital or were
poorly reasoned, we would decline to follow it" (citation omitted)); State v.
Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986) (noting that identical pro-
visions need not be interpreted identically); Brennan, supra note 74, at 500
(stressing that "[e]xamples abound where state courts have independently con-
sidered the merits of constitutional arguments and declined to follow opinions
of the United States Supreme Court they find unconvincing, even where the
state and federal constitutions are similarly or identically phrased" (emphasis
added)); Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 68.
86. See State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 727 (Minn. 1985) (holding that a
United States Supreme Court interpretation of an identical provision is "of in-
herently persuasive, although not necessarily compelling, force").
87. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (listing the other three
factors the Minnesota Supreme Court has considered when construing a state
constitutional provision differently than a parallel federal constitutional
provision).
88. See, e.g., State v. Hamm, 423 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Minn. 1988) (noting that
"[w]hile a decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting an identi-
cal provision of the federal Constitution may be persuasive, it should not be
automatically followed or our separate constitution will be of little value"); see
also State v. Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 346-49 (Minn. 1986) (holding that a stat-
ute imposing vicarious criminal liability for selling intoxicants to minors vio-
lates the due process clause of the Minnesota Constitution, even if the United
States Supreme Court were to uphold such a statute under the identically
worded due process clause of the United States Constitution, because the stat-
ute intrudes too severely on individual liberty and the state can accomplish de-
terrence by alternative means); State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 904-05
(Minn. 1983) (stating that existing Minnesota rules and precedents providing
an expansive right to counsel and exceeding federal constitutional require-
ments must be observed, "regardless of federal constitutional underpinnings,"
to ensure the fair administration of justice in Minnesota).
89. See, e.g., Hamm, 423 N.W.2d at 382 (noting that "[the Minnesota
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the appropriate standard to apply in all cases, this presumption
may be rebutted if one or more of the above factors9° indicate
the need for a different interpretation.
2. State Constitutional and Common Law History
The Minnesota Supreme Court considers state constitu-
tional and common law history to determine the intent of the
drafters in creating a constitutional provision. The drafters'
statements may indicate whether they intended a particular
provision to provide protection independent of the federal con-
stitution.9 1 A broader interpretation may be necessary to ad-
here to these statements, as well as to the language of other
provisions guaranteeing rights in the state constitution. 92 In ad-
dition, state case law may reveal whether the judiciary has in-
terpreted the state bill of rights in general, and the disputed
provision in particular, as providing greater protection than the
federal constitution.9 3 Similarly, examining Minnesota's consti-
Supreme Court] must remain independently responsible for safeguarding the
rights of our own citizens").
90. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (listing the four factors
the Minnesota Supreme Court has considered when deciding whether to con-
strue a state constitutional provision differently than a federal constitutional
provision).
91. See Crowell v. Lambert, 9 Minn. 267, 276-77 (1864) (examining the de-
bates of the Democratic convention in analyzing the article on the judiciary);
Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 70 (maintaining that "[a]lthough only
rarely used by Minnesota lawyers or courts, the Minnesota convention debates
are a potentially significant resource when the Minnesota Bill of Rights is at
issue" (footnote omitted)).
92. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986); see also
Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 69-70 (arguing that the "plenary safe-
guards" in article I, § 8 of the Minnesota Constitution provide "a legitimate ba-
sis, even an affirmative mandate, for Minnesota courts to go beyond the
minimum standards of justice established by the Federal Constitution").
93. This factor was considered by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State
v. Hamm, where the court held that a statute allowing six, rather than 12, per-
son juries in misdemeanor cases violated the Minnesota Constitution. The
Hamm court analyzed the case in light of the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970), that the word "jury" in
the federal constitution allows a jury of six. Against this holding, the court
weighed hundreds of years of English common law history and long-standing
Minnesota precedent recognizing a jury as a body of 12 persons. The court de-
termined that in order to fulfill its responsibility for preserving state constitu-
tional rights and adhering to the framers' intent, it was required to reject the
United States Supreme Court's position and find that the word "jury" in the
Minnesota Constitution required a body of 12 persons. See State v. Hamm, 423
N.W.2d 379, 382-84, 386 (Minn. 1988).
The Hamm court's analysis reveals the state supreme court's commitment
to preserving state constitutional protections that it believes are in danger of
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tutional and common law history may help to determine
whether the drafters intended the state search and seizure pro-
vision to provide greater protection than the Supreme Court's
current fourth amendment interpretation.
3. Existing State Law
Minnesota courts also examine existing state law to deter-
mine whether to provide Minnesotans heightened constitu-
tional protections. Laws enforcing state constitutional
guarantees may help define the scope of the constitutional right
and serve as a justification for providing different protection
than the federal rule.94 Rather than contradict these state
being undermined. The Hamm court struck down the authorizing statute as
unconstitutional under the state constitution despite the fact that Minnesota
courts already had been conducting six-person jury trials in criminal cases for
over 15 years. Id. at 386. Moreover, as pointed out by the dissent, the number
of jurors had always been defined by statute in Minnesota, suggesting that
"the framers intended no fixed and unchanging number" of jurors. Id. at 387-
88. The majority discounted these facts, however, deciding that it must pre-
serve the rights of Minnesota citizens and the intent of the framers by inter-
preting the constitution to guarantee 12-person juries. Id. at 385-86.
Other states consider this factor when analyzing the scope of a state con-
stitutional guarantee. See Abrahamson, supra note 51, at 1182 (noting that
several states have departed from federal precedent after reviewing, among
other things, "English and American common law, prior state case law, and
the historical development of federal and state doctrine").
94. See State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901, 905 (Minn. 1983); see also
Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61.62, 66, 720 P.2d at 812, 815.
The Minnesota Supreme Court cited existing law in Nordstrom when it
declined to follow Justice Blackmun's opinion in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S.
222 (1980) (per curiam). Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d at 904-05. In Baldasar, the de-
fendant protested the use of an earlier uncounseled guilty plea to a prior of-
fense to enhance his charge from a misdemeanor to a felony. 446 U.S. at 223.
In a 4-1-4 split, the United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's
right to counsel was violated by the enhancement use of the uncounseled
guilty plea, even though the defendant was not actually imprisoned for the
prior offense and the previous conviction was thus valid under Scott v. Illinois,
440 U.S. 367 (1979). Id at 224. In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun
agreed with the result on the narrower ground that because the defendant's
earlier offense was punishable by more than six months, he should be entitled
to counsel at the prior proceeding. 446 U.S. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
In Nordstrom, the state relied on Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977), in arguing that Blackmun's opinion was controlling in Baldasar. Brief
for Appellee at 6, State v. Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d 901 (Minn. 1983) (No. CO-82-
1069). The state thus argued that because the defendant had been charged in
the earlier case with a crime punishable by only 90 days imprisonment, and
because the defendant was not indigent at the prior proceeding, he was not en-
titled to counsel. Id. at 8; Nordstrom, 331 N.W.2d at 905. Despite Blackmun's
opinion and despite a federal constitutional interpretation requiring counsel
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rules, the court will apply the state constitution in conformity
with the rules, if it finds the protections necessary to preserve
state constitutional guarantees.9 5 Existing Minnesota law may
likewise define the scope of the protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures, and indicate the proper standard for
granting standing to persons wishing to challenge such govern-
mental conduct.
4. Matters of Particular State Interest or Local Concern
Minnesota courts also consider whether matters of particu-
lar state interest or local concern dictate interpreting a Minne-
sota constitutional provision differently than a parallel federal
provision. Unfortunately, discerning the scope of this factor
and the policies undergirding it is difficult, because Minnesota
courts have not explained the factor in detail.9 Generally,
only if the defendant is actually imprisoned, the Nordstrom court recognized
its long-standing state constitutional rule that counsel be provided in any case
which may lead to the defendant's incarceration. Id. at 904-05 (comparing
State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967) with Scott v. Illi-
nois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)). The court thus held that an uncounseled guilty plea
to a misdemeanor offense could not be used to enhance a subsequent offense
under any circumstances unless the record reflected a valid waiver of counsel.
Id. at 905.
95. The Nordstrom court did not expressly ground its holding in the Min-
nesota Constitution. See McDonnell v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 460
N.W.2d 363, 368 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that Nordstrom is not based on
express constitutional guarantees, but on the court's supervisory powers). The
Nordstrom court, however, strongly indicated that its holding was necessary to
safeguard Minnesotans' constitutional and statutory right to counsel. 331
N.W.2d at 905. Insisting that "[the] right to counsel and the Rules of Criminal
Procedure we have established to protect it must be observed," the court cited
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.09 as requiring courts to preserve a record of guilty pleas
in misdemeanor cases. Id. The court implied that this rule not only enforced
the state constitutional right to counsel, but helped define the scope of that
right, as it applied to all guilty pleas to misdemeanors punishable by incarcera-
tion. Id. at 904. The court determined that its requirement of counsel in all
misdemeanor cases where the defendant might be imprisoned, coupled with
the record-keeping requirements of Rule 15.09, required that the prior un-
counseled guilty plea indicate a valid waiver of counsel to be used for enhance-
ment purposes in all cases, regardless of whether the defendant was actually
imprisoned for the previous offense. Id. at 905. Thus, rather than contradict
the procedural rule, the court adopted an interpretation different than the
United States Supreme Court, and imposed a broader record-keeping require-
ment for cases in Minnesota. Id.
96. This factor was considered in State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766, 771
(Minn. 1986). After the United States Supreme Court held in Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984), that the defendant's confession to his probation
officer was not "compelled" and thus not violative of the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution, id. at 440, the confession was admitted at de-
fendant's trial on remand. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d at 770. The defendant was
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however, commentators suggest that application of this factor
requires the resolution of several lesser questions: whether the
state court is in a better position than the federal courts to de-
cide the controversy because of its superior knowledge, experi-
ence with, and proximity to the controversy; whether the
controversy requires individualized rather than broad, uniform
resolution; and whether other unique circumstances mandate a
decision contrary to the existing federal interpretation.9 7 This
factor may therefore be relevant if individual Minnesota condi-
tions require a different test for standing than those of other
states adhering to the federal "legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy" standard for standing to contest searches and seizures.
III. ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE MINNESOTA
CONSTITUTION PROTECTS PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND PROVIDES POSSESSORY CRIMES
DEFENDANTS WITH AUTOMATIC
STANDING TO CONTEST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
An application of the Minnesota Supreme Court's factors
suggests that article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution
protects personal property from unreasonable government
seizures, regardless of whether the seizure implicates privacy
rights. These factors, and the policy concerns they reflect, re-
veal that the court will not hesitate to interpret a state consti-
tutional provision more broadly than its federal counterpart if
necessary to preserve the original intent of the framers or to
protect the constitutional rights of Minnesotans. Applying
these factors to the Minnesota Bill of Rights reveals that the
framers intended to protect property rights from government
intrusion, and that automatic standing is necessary to preserve
these rights for Minnesotans accused of possessory crimes.
then convicted of first-degree murder. Id, at 768. The defendant appealed his
conviction on the ground that the confession was compelled under the identi-
cal self-incrimination provision in the Minnesota Constitution. See MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 7. The state supreme court, in considering "whether the
unique relationship between probationer and probation officer as seen in the
light of the philosophy of the Minnesota criminal justice system requires ... a
view contrary to that expressed by the United States Supreme Court in this
very case," concluded that it did not and that the United States Supreme
Court had correctly stated the law under the state constitution as well as the
federal constitution. Id. at 771. The court provided no guidance as to how or
why it reached this conclusion.
97. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 76.
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A. TEXTUAL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PARALLEL STATE AND
FEDERAL PROVISIONS
Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution and the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution are virtu-
ally identical. The state constitutional provision reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vi-
olated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
9 8
This textual similarity with the fourth amendment may indi-
cate that the framers intended that the scope of the state
search and seizure provision be co-extensive with that of the
federal fourth amendment.99 The fact, however, that the two
provisions are virtually identical is not necessarily dispositive if
any one of the other three factors set forth above 00 suggest the
need for a different interpretation.""1
In addition, the Minnesota Supreme Court has indicated
that article I, section 10 may be interpreted more broadly than
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal
fourth amendment."°2 Relying on this proposition,"°3 the Min-
98. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. The fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution has the same text but slightly different punctuation. See supra
note 2 (quoting the text of the fourth amendment).
99. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (recognizing the rule of
statutory construction that the other jurisdiction's interpretation is presumed
to have been adopted with a borrowed provision).
100. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (listing the three other
factors the Minnesota Supreme Court has considered when considering
whether to construe a state constitutional provision differently than a parallel
federal constitutional provision).
101. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (noting courts' and com-
mentators' arguments that identical provisions should not necessarily be inter-
preted similarly).
102. See O'Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405 (Minn. 1979).
103. See State v. Herbst, 395 N.W.2d 399, 404 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (refus-
ing to apply the United States Supreme Court's "good faith" fourth amend-
ment exception to article I, § 10). By refusing to apply the "good faith"
exception, the Herbst court implied that the exclusionary rule is not only in-
tended as a deterrent to wrongful police conduct in Minnesota, but also as a
means to protect citizens against erosion of their rights and preserve the integ-
rity of the judicial process. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (in-
ferring that by providing broader protection under the state exclusionary rule,
state courts have found that the state rule has a broader purpose than the fed-
eral rule). This expansive approach is contrary to United States Supreme
Court rulings regarding the purpose of the exclusionary rule. See supra note
22 and accompanying text (citing Supreme Court cases noting that the main
purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterrence).
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nesota Court of Appeals applied section 10 to find broader pro-
tection for Minnesota citizens against unreasonable searches
and seizures than that found in the fourth amendment. 10 4
Thus, despite the identical language of the state and federal
provisions, Minnesota courts generally recognize that the state
search and seizure provision may be construed more expan-
sively than the federal fourth amendment if other factors re-
quire a different result.
B. MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAW HISTORY
As noted above, 0 5 Minnesota's constitutional and common
law history may be useful in determining whether to construe
the state search and seizure provision more broadly than the
federal provision. Between the two, Minnesota's constitutional
history may be of relatively limited assistance. Because the del-
egates of the Republican and Democratic parties refused to
meet together, the Minnesota Constitution was promulgated at
two separate conventions.10 6 Moreover, delegates at both con-
104. The Minnesota Court of Appeals continues to follow Herbst. See, e.g.,
State v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Gabbert,
411 N.W.2d 209, 214 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (noting the Herbst holding and re-
fusing to adopt the federal "good faith exception" in Minnesota). Several
other states have also refused to adopt the federal rule. See, e.g., Stringer v.
State, 491 So.2d 837, 841-51 (Miss. 1986) (Robertson, J., concurring); State v.
Novembrino, 200 N.J. Super. 229, 244-45, 491 A.2d 37, 46 (Super. Ct. App. Div.
1985); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 427, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d
630, 637 (1985).
105. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (discussing generally
Minnesota cases examining state constitutional and common law history).
106. The Minnesota Constitutional Convention was created in separate Re-
publican and Democratic Conventions after the two parties refused to meet to-
gether. Each party drafted its own constitution in a separate wing of the
capitol building, and the two sides then formed a conference committee which
drafted a compromise constitution. For a detailed recount of these events, see
W. ANDERSON & A. LOBB, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA 69-
114 (1921).
Given this split between the delegates, the value of the Minnesota consti-
tutional debates as an aid to interpreting particular provisions may be ques-
tionable. See Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 81, 99 (1865) (arguing that
"[constitutional] debates should not influence a court in expounding a constitu-
tion in any case," but that even if such an inquiry were ordinarily proper, "it
seems quite obvious that such a rule could not properly be followed in this
case" given the division between the two conventions); W. ANDERSON & A.
LOBB, supra, at 113 (reasoning that "[w]hen all the facts are considered ... it is
impossible to escape the conclusion that the debates in the two wings of the
Minnesota constitutional convention have for legal purposes far less value
than is ordinarily the case with constitutional debates").
Apparently, even the delegates to the two conventions disagreed on the
value of the debates as an aid to interpreting the state constitution. Compare
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ventions had little to say while adopting their respective search
and seizure provisions. 07 These circumstances tend to make
the constitutional drafters' intent somewhat obscure.
Despite these limitations, Minnesota's constitutional and
common law history can be helpful. The constitutional history
reveals that several drafters stated their desire that the Minne-
sota Constitution be interpreted independently of the federal
constitution,108 while others expressed their understanding that
THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MINNESOTA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEN-
TION 599 (F. Smith ed. 1857) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION] (state-
ment of Delegate Sherburne assuring the members of the Democratic
convention that there was no meaningful difference between what the Demo-
crats had proposed and what the compromise committee had adopted) with
DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
TERRITORY OF MINNESOTA 583 (T. Andrews ed. 1858) [hereinafter REPUBLICAN
CONVENTION] (statement by Delegate Robbins that "to say that our debates
have any relevance to this constitution, seems to me to be erroneous").
107. At the Republican Convention, delegates argued briefly about
whether to restrict searches and seizures to those based on written complaints,
and adopted a version nearly identical to the federal fourth amendment. RE-
PUBLICAN CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 105. Also, note the following ex-
change at the Republican Convention:
Mr. ALDRICH. I move to amend [§ 10] by inserting after the
word "but" the words "on complaint in writing."
Mr. PERKINS. The language used in this section is the same as
that employed in the Constitution of the United States, and it seems
to me to be sufficient. The Legislature can carry out the provision in
detail.
Id After additional debate, the proposed amendment failed. Id.
The delegates to the Democratic Convention adopted an identical provi-
sion with no debate at all. See DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, supra note 106, at
204-11, 276-94, 307-49, 361-73 (proposing a search and seizure provision textu-
ally identical to the federal fourth amendment, and adopting the provision
with no debate).
108. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 97. The dele-
gates considered the merits of a proposed amendment to what is now § 4. Id.
In response to a statement that a proposed provision should be adopted be-
cause it was textually identical to one found in most other state constitutions,
one delegate argued:
Now I am not one of those who deem it my special duty to follow
what is prescribed in some other instrument. The gentleman from
Winona. . . in every instance in which he has spoken in favor of any
measure, has based his views upon the fact that some other instru-
ment has contained a provision similar to the one under considera-
tion. While I would pay due regard to all other Constitutions, I am
not willing to bind myself to follow their example in all respects. I
am not afraid of adopting some new ideas, if they seem reasonable
and proper. I believe we may well make some improvements.
Id. (statement of Delegate Colburn). Another delegate agreed, stating that
"[ilt is true, as [Delegate Colburn] says, that improvements should be made
upon the Constitutions which have been made before. It is equally true that
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article I protections are fundamental.1 0 9 Moreover, debate
about other article I provisions suggests that the framers in-
tended to define the scope of property rights protected in the
Minnesota Bill of Rights.L10
The language of article I, section 8, also strongly suggests
that the framers intended to protect property rights from un-
reasonable government conduct, without regard to whether
those rights generate a "legitimate expectation of privacy." Ar-
ticle I, section 8 reads:
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all inju-
ries or wrongs which he may receive to his person, property, or char-
acter, and to obtain justice freely and without purchase, completely
and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformable to the
laws. 11
Construing article I, section 10 to protect property interests
only if privacy interests also are violated undermines section 8's
comprehensive protection of property rights. Although a
search may implicate both privacy and property interests, a
no Constitution was ever framed which was in itself perfect, and not suscepti-
ble of some improvement." Id. at 98 (statement of Delegate Perkins).
Similar sentiments were expressed at the Democratic Convention, where
Delegates Gorman and Brown debated whether the United States Constitution
is "wrong" in giving the President the power to adjourn both houses of Con-
gress. See DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 378 (statements of
Delegates Gorman and Brown).
109. See REPUBLICAN CONVENTION, supra note 106, at 101. For example, at
one point, a delegate to the Republican Convention proposed that § 5 (regard-
ing bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment) and § 6 (regarding
the accused's rights to a jury trial, compulsory process, counsel, etc.) be moved
from article I to an article dealing with the judiciary. Id. at 100-02. Other del-
egates, however, opposed the proposal on the ground that the two sections be-
longed in the Bill of Rights, which "set[s] forth to the world those
fundamental ideas and principles which underlie our Constitution." Id. at 101
(statement of Delegate Perkins).
110. For example, at the Democratic Convention, in a lengthy discussion
over the conflict between the federal government's power to supervise the pri-
mary disposal of land and the state's power to supervise the inheritance of
property, several delegates indicated that they believed the states generally
have the power to administer property rights, subject to the limited powers ex-
pressly granted to the federal government. See DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION,
supra note 106, at 288-94, 307-41. In particular, a former Governor of the Min-
nesota Territory stressed that the delegates "must not confound political
rights with the rights of property," the latter which are within the province of
the states. Id. at 328-29 (statement of Delegate Gorman); see also id. at 319,
333 (statements of Delegate Sibley that "the law of the United States... does
not regulate the right of inheritance in Minnesota," and that "the State ha[s]
the right to regulate the Law of Descent"). A majority of the delegates even-
tually voted against a proposal to deny full enjoyment of property rights to
aliens who were not bona fide residents. Id. at 334, 33940.
111. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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seizure is likely to implicate only property interests, unless the
property by its nature generates privacy interests." 2 By re-
stricting the provision to protect only defendants who can
demonstrate that the government violated their "legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy," a court denies the provision's protections
to a large class of defendants whose property rights are violated
by government seizures. 1 3 Moreover, seizing and examining an
item to determine whether it is contraband is effectively a
"search" and a violation of the owner's privacy interest in the
seized item.114 Thus, by interfering with possession, an unrea-
112. For example, a suitcase. See Simien, supra note 20, at 501; see also
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that
"[t]he [fourth] [a]mendment protects two different interests of the citizen -
the interest in retaining possession of property and the interest in maintaining
personal privacy. A seizure threatens the former, a search the latter"); United
States v. Lisk, 522 F.2d 228, 231 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that although the gov-
ernment's seizure of contraband implicated the defendant's fourth amendment
rights, the government did not violate the defendant's privacy interest; thus,
the defendant was without standing to challenge the government's
misconduct).
113. See Simien, supra note 20, at 501.
114. For example, if the government seizes a substance that it suspects is
cocaine, and tests the substance in order to determine whether it is indeed co-
caine, it has conducted a "search" of the substance. See id at 510. But see
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984), where the Court held that seiz-
ing and testing a substance to determine whether it is contraband does not vio-
late any fourth amendment interest, and no fourth amendment "seizure"
occurs:
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular
substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in
privacy .... But even if the results are negative - merely disclosing
that the substance is something other than cocaine - such a result
reveals nothing of special interest. Congress has decided - and there
is no question about its power to do so - to treat the interest in "pri-
vately" possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct
that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably
"private" fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.
Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
Simien responds:
[This view of the fourth amendment] violates a basic tenet of property
law; namely, that the nature of the possessor's interests are irrelevant
unless the one objecting to his possession can show a better claim to
title. In addition, this analysis allows the action of the government to
be justified by its results, a heretofore untenable position in fourth
amendment jurisprudence.
Simien, supra note 20, at 510 (footnotes omitted). Simien also notes that such
an interpretation contradicts "the historical developments and underpinnings
of the amendment." Id.; see also supra note 20 (noting the origin of the
amendment as a response to indiscriminate governmental searches and
seizures of contraband).
Simien's comments lead to an inescapable conclusion: the Supreme
Court's Jacobsen analysis drastically reduces the social benefits of fourth
1286 [Vol. 75:1255
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION
sonable seizure of one's property constitutes an "injury or
wrong" within the meaning of article I, section 8, regardless of
whether the seizure also violates the possessor's "legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy."
When a court denies a defendant standing to invoke article
I, section 10 to protect property rights violated by a search and
seizure, the court denies the defendant the benefits of the ex-
clusionary remedy. This refusal to provide a suitable remedy
contradicts the language of article I, section 8, which expressly
guarantees a remedy for property rights violations. A court,
however, acts consistently with section 8's guarantees if it inter-
prets article I, section 10 to protect against unreasonable
seizures of property, excluding as evidence property unreasona-
bly seized." 5 Therefore, to be consistent with section 8's guar-
antee of a remedy for property rights violations, courts should
interpret article I, section 10 to protect property rights, and
provide the exclusionary remedy when a search and seizure vi-
olates a defendant's property rights.
Minnesota common law also provides evidence that the
Minnesota, Bill of Rights protects property rights from govern-
ment intrusion. In some early cases, the Minnesota Supreme
Court applied the protections of article I, section 8 to public of-
ficials, holding that the government cannot deny the benefits of
the judicial process to rebels,"16 nor drive paupers from their
amendment protections. After all, one can safely assume that the only per-
sons seeking vindication of their fourth amendment rights via the exclusionary
rule are those who stand to gain from suppressing the evidence; i.e., the guilty.
By allowing only the innocent to seek exclusion, the Court greatly reduces the
number of fourth amendment challenges. With fewer of its unlawful acts un-
punished, the government may feel free to commit increasing numbers of un-
lawful searches and seizures. See, ag., United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727,
730 (1980) (noting the lower court's finding that "the Government affirma-
tively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment standing limitation per-
mits them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure of
one individual in order to obthin evidence against third parties"). This under-
cuts the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect, which is, according to the Court,
the primary purpose of the rule. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see
also Comment, supra note 54, at 582 (arguing that "if privacy rights are to be
protected from state intrusion, defendants must, at the very least, be able to
challenge illegal searches or seizures").
115. Besides acting consistently with article I, § 8, the court would comply
with § 8's "affirmative mandate" to generally provide broader protections for
Minnesotans. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 70.
116. See Davis v. Pierse, 7 Minn. 13 (1862) (relying on article I, § 8 in invali-
dating an 1862 law that suspended the right of confederate rebels to have ac-
cess to Minnesota courts).
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homes and force them to live in separate towns.117 Thus, the
court found that, although not specifically enumerated, the full
enjoyment of property rights nevertheless is inherent in the
Minnesota Bill of Rights.118
In other early cases, however, the Minnesota Supreme
Court seemed to undercut the full enjoyment of property rights
for defendants charged with possessing contraband by holding
that defendants charged with possessing contraband could not
suppress as evidence contraband obtained by unreasonable
searches and seizures." 9 These holdings suggest that article I,
section 10 may protect only lawful ownership interests while
leaving possessory interests in contraband unprotected.12 °
117. See Theide v. Town of Scandia Valley, 217 Minn. 218, 14 N.W. 2d 400
(1944), where the government, acting pursuant to statute, forcibly removed a
family in sub-zero weather to another town in order to obtain poor relief.
The court invalidated the statute on the ground that it was inconsistent with
"fundamental law," and therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 226, 14 N.W.2d at
406.
118. Id. at 224-25, 14 N.W.2d at 405. The Thiede court declared:
The entire social and political structure of America rests upon the
cornerstone that all men have certain rights which are inherent and
unalienable. Among these are the right to be protected in life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness; the right to acquire, possess, and enjoy
property; and the right to establish a home and family relations - all
under equal and impartial laws which govern the whole community
and each member thereof.... The rights, privileges, and immunities
of citizens exist notwithstanding there is no specific enumeration
thereof in State Constitutions.
Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded that the defendant sheriff was lia-
ble under article I, § 8, as "[those] words were not inserted in the constitution
as a matter of idle ceremony, or as a string of glittering generalities, and must
be respected by public officers." Id. at 230, 14 N.W.2d at 408.
119. See State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 195 N.W. 789 (1923). In Pluth, the
defendant was charged with illegally possessing liquor that officers found in
his automobile. Id. at 147, 195 N.W. at 789-90. At his arraignment, the defend-
ant moved that the liquor be suppressed as evidence and returned to him, on
the ground that the search and seizure had violated, inter alia, the fourth
amendment and article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. Id. at 147, 195
N.W. at 790. Although the court agreed with the defendant that the search
and seizure were unlawful, it held the evidence was admissible, citing a line of
Minnesota cases admitting evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search. Id. at
153-55, 195 N.W. at 792-93.
120. In Pluth, for example, the court noted:
[Tihe [illegal possession] statutes . . . declare that no property right
shall exist in property of any kind used or intended for use in [violat-
ing the statute].... The defendant had no property right in the liquor
seized. It was contraband and forfeited to the state, and he was not
entitled to have it returned to him.
Id. at 156, 195 N.W. at 793. The court concluded that because the defendant
was not entitled to have the liquor returned to him, it was the state's property,
and could lawfully be used as evidence. Id. at 157, 195 N.W. at 793-94.
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A better reading of these early cases, however, is that
although the searches and seizures violated the constitutional
rights of the defendants, the court nevertheless refused to al-
low the defendants to suppress the illegally-obtained items as
evidence. 121 Thus, the court did not hold that defendants
charged with possessing contraband were without standing to
challenge the searches and seizures as unconstitutional.122 Nor
did the court hold that the searches and seizures were law-
ful.as Instead, the court concluded that even though the
searches and seizures were unlawful, 124 the defendants were le-
gally entitled to suppress items unlawfully obtained only if
they were entitled to return of the contraband.1 25 Conse-
quently, because the defendants had no statutorily protected
property interest in the contraband, the court held that they
were not entitled to either the contraband's return nor its sup-
pression as evidence. 2 6
121. Subsequent Minnesota Supreme Court opinions support this narrow
interpretation of Pluth. See, e.g., State v. Kaasa, 198 Minn. 181, 184, 269 N.W.
365, 366 (1936) (citing Pluth and other cases for the proposition 'liquor or other
property, though forcibly seized, and even though unlawfully seized, may be
received in evidence' (quoting City of Mankato v. Grabowenski, 154 Minn. 265,
267 191 N.W. 603, 603 (1923))).
122. See generally Pluth, 157 Minn. at 152, 195 N.W. at 792 (neglecting to
address the issue of standing, and concluding that the search was
unreasonable).
123. Id.
124. See id at 153, 195 N.W. at 792. The court said:
The statute gives authority to seize but not to search, and an officer
acting under it is authorized to seize only what he may discover with-
out the unreasonable search prohibited by the Constitution .... A
search which is unlawful when it begins is not made lawful by the dis-
covery that an offense has been committed.... The fact that defend-
ant was transporting liquor not being discoverable without a search,
the offense of transporting it was not committed in the presence of
the officers, and they had no authority to arrest him therefor without
a warrant, and the search was unlawful because made without a war-
rant and not as an incident to an unlawful arrest.
Id. (citations omitted).
125. See id at 155, 195 N.W. at 793 (holding that the defendant had no right
to suppression of the evidence, "for the defendant had no right to the liquor in
question, and no right to the possession of it at the time it was seized, and is
not entitled to have it returned to him").
126. The Pluth court believed that "[elven the federal rule, as we under-
stand it, does not forbid the use of evidence against the accused of property
taken from his possession in an unlawful search unless he is entitled to have it
returned to him and makes timely application for its return." Id. at 155, 195
N.W. at 792. Federal courts implementing the federal exclusionary rule appar-
ently disagreed. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 187 F.2d 498, 502 (D.C. Cir.
1950) (holding that suppression of an illegally-obtained item as evidence is ap-
propriate, even if the defendant is not entitled to return of the item), aff'd,
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These early cases, however, are no longer valid precedent
because, for the past thirty years,m7 Minnesota courts have ap-
plied the exclusionary rule to suppress as evidence contraband
obtained by unlawful searches and seizures.' s Thus, when de-
ciding whether to suppress illegally-obtained evidence, Minne-
sota courts no longer consider the nature of the seized item, but
rather focus on the reasonableness of the search and seizure.' 9
Moreover, when applying the exclusionary rule, Minnesota
courts130 have suggested that the policy undergirding the state
342 U.S. 48 (1951); Simmons v. United States, 18 F.2d 85, 89 (8th Cir. 1927) (ex-
cluding illegally-obtained whisky as evidence in illegal possession case).
127. Ever since the United States Supreme Court applied the exclusionary
remedy to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, Minnesotans charged with possessory
crimes who have been victimized by unreasonable searches and seizures have
been entitled to exclusion of the illegally-obtained evidence. See supra notes
21, 65 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., State v. Longoria, No. 80597 (Minn. Ct. App. July 25, 1989)
(WESTLAW, MN Database) (suppressing cocaine); State v. Schnorr, 403
N.W.2d 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (suppressing marijuana cigarettes); State v.
Herbst, 395 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (suppressing LSD); State v.
Mitchell, 285 Minn. 153, 172 N.W.2d 66 (1969) (suppressing marijuana).
129. The Pluth line of cases merely reflects the Minnesota Supreme
Court's inclination against adopting the exclusionary rule as a matter of state
law, especially for possessory crimes. At the time of the Pluth opinion, the
states were not required to implement the federal exclusionary remedy. See
State v. Pluth, 157 Minn. 145, 154, 195 N.W.2d 789, 792 (1923) (maintaining that
"enforcement of criminal law would be most seriously handicapped in many
instances, if not wholly crippled, by adherence to [the exclusionary] rule" (ci-
tation omitted)). Thus, in Minnesota, evidence obtained via an unreasonable
search or seizure was not excluded from trial. See State v. Rigg ex rel. Far-
rington, 259 Minn. 483, 485, 107 N.W.2d 841, 842 (1961) (citing Pluth and other
cases in noting that the rule in Minnesota is that "evidence is admissible even
when it has been obtained by unlawful search"). Rather, the law provided a
remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures in the criminal courts. See
MINN. STAT. § 621.17 (1947) (repealed 1963), which provided in pertinent part:
Oppression under color of office. Every public officer, or person pre-
tending to be such, who unlawfully and maliciously, under pretense
or color of official authority:
(2) seize or levy upon another's property; ... or
(4) do any other act whereby another person shall be injured in
his person, property, or rights -
Commits oppression, and shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
1I Since the 1963 Mapp opinion made the exclusionary rule applicable in
Minnesota, the remedy for an unreasonable search or seizure has been exclu-
sion of the evidence from trial. See supra notes 21, 65, 127-28 and accompany-
ing text.
130. See State v. Herbst, 395 N.W.2d 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). In Herbst,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals strongly suggested that article I, § 10 requires
suppression of contraband seized in an unreasonable search, and that this rem-
edy has a broader purpose than the federal exclusionary rule. The Herbst
court refused to adopt the federal "good faith" exception to the exclusionary
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exclusionary rule is not only deterrence, 13 ' but also preserva-
tion of government and judicial integrity.1 32
Minnesota's constitutional and common law history thus
indicate the purpose of article I, section 10 was to protect prop-
erty, as well as privacy, from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Minnesota courts should therefore recognize that
property rights are protected by article I, section 10, and allow
a defendant standing to challenge an unlawful search and
seizure that infringes the defendant's property interest.
Providing persons charged with possessory crimes auto-
matic standing to challenge a search and seizure is a logical way
rule for cases where the evidence is unlawfully, albeit innocently, seized by of-
ficers. Id. at 404. Although the court apparently concluded that the "good
faith" exception, even if adopted, did not apply in the Herbst case, it stated ex-
pressly that it refused to adopt the exception as matter of state constitutional
law. Id. (holding "[w]e do not believe this is an appropriate case in which to
make such a dramatic change in the interpretation of the Minnesota Constitu-
tion"). Despite numerous requests by state prosecutors to adopt the Leon good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, courts have so far refused to do so.
See, e.g., State v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State, v.
Lindsey, 460 N.W.2d 632, 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990); State v. McClosky, 451
N.W.2d 225, 229 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 453 N.W.2d 700
(Minn. 1990); Minnesota State Patrol Troopers Ass'n ex reL Pince v. Minnesota
Dep't of Pub. Safety, 437 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
131. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting that the United
States Supreme Court has expressly stated that the sole purpose of the exclu-
sionary rule is deterrence). For an excellent discussion of federal treatment of
the exclusionary rule, see Note, The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule Under
the Burger Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REv. 363 (1981).
132. Minnesota courts have repeatedly refused to adopt the Leon excep-
tion. See cases cited supra note 104. This indicates that the courts have found
a broader purpose in the state exclusionary rule.
In Herbst, for example, despite the agents' apparently subjective belief
that the warrant was valid, the court maintained that:
[t]he purposes of the exclusionary rule are furthered by suppressing
evidence obtained pursuant to such a warrant. Law enforcement per-
sonnel must abide by the constitutional limitation on their ability to'
search private dwellings. The requirements of the fourth amendment
to the United States Constitution and the Minnesota Constitution
with respect to search and seizure are not unduly burdensome.
Where, as here, due care is not taken to meet those requirements,
suppression is the appropriate remedy.
Herbst, 395 N.W.2d at 399. The court thus held the police to the technical re-
quirements imposed by the fourth amendment and article I, § 10. The court
apparently believed that it must protect the integrity of the system imple-
menting article I, § 10 to prevent erosion of the constitutional right to be free
of unreasonable searches and seizures. The court implied that protection of
government and judicial integrity, as well as deterrence, are purposes of the
exclusionary rule. See also Note, supra note 22, at 968-69 (recognizing that one
goal of the exclusionary rule is to preserve judicial integrity, and that implicit
in this goal is a desire to redress constitutional violations).
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to safeguard the property rights protected by sections 8 and 10.
First, by alleging that the defendant unlawfully possessed a
particular item, the state effectively concedes she has a posses-
sory interest in the item.133 Providing a possessory crimes de-
fendant with automatic standing to contest the seizure of the
item recognizes her property interest and is consistent with the
drafters' guarantee of a remedy for persons deprived of prop-
erty.1s4 The automatic standing rule also helps preserve the
rights guaranteed in the state search and seizure provision by
deterring police from illegally obtaining evidence to use against
persons who are unable to challenge the government's miscon-
duct.1' In addition, the rule helps preserve the judiciary's in-
tegrity by increasing the application of the exclusionary rule.'3
When courts punish unlawful police conduct, the public recog-
nizes that the courts are fulfilling their role as guardians of
state constitutional rights. This recognition in turn ensures
that the public will trust and value the judiciary.
C. EXISTING STATE LAW
Existing state law may also help to define the scope of the
constitutional interest. In the area of search and seizure, Min-
nesota courts provide greater protections against government
misconduct than the United States Supreme Court. For exam-
ple, Minnesota courts do not allow custodial arrests and
searches for minor traffic offenses, which federal law per-
mits. 137 In addition, Minnesota courts have implied that article
133. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 67-69, 470 A.2d 457, 469
(1983) (holding that because a property interest in searched or seized property
is sufficient for standing, "it necessarily follows that a person charged with a
possessory offense must be accorded automatic standing" to challenge a search
or seizure).
134. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (noting that by provid-
ing the exclusionary remedy only for privacy rights violations, courts contra-
dict article I, § 8's guarantee of a remedy for property rights violations).
135. See supra note 114 (citing Payner as evidence that the government
may deliberately commit unlawful searches and seizures to obtain evidence
against persons without standing to challenge the misconduct); see also Com-
ment, supra note 54, at 587 (arguing that "[b]y limiting the ability of defend-
ants to obtain standing [through restrictive application of the legitimate
expectation of privacy test], the Court limits the effectiveness of the exclusion-
ary rule, a rule that has served as the only meaningful method of controlling
police conduct").
136. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (concluding that Min-
nesota courts meant to maintain judicial integrity in cases providing broader
protections under the state exclusionary remedy than under the federal rule).
137. Compare State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971) and
State v. Gannaway, 291 Minn. 391, 191 N.W.2d 555 (1971) with United States v.
1292 [Vol. 75:1255
MINNESOTA CONSTITUTION
I, section 10 provides broader protection than the fourth
amendment, and that the state exclusionary rule has a broader
purpose than the federal rule. 13
Existing state law indicates that article I, section 10 pro-
tects property rights. Under Minnesota law, only the person
"aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" can seek the re-
turn of seized property or exclude the property as evidence.139
In addition, a Minnesota statute requires an officer who law-
fully seizes property to leave a receipt with the person dispos-
sessed of the property, rather than the person whose privacy
rights are infringed, 140 regardless of whether the seized prop-
erty is contraband.141 By requiring the officer to provide the
dispossessed person with a receipt, the law recognizes that the
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
This difference extends to vehicle searches. Compare State v. Hoven, 269
N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1978) with New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
138. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text (discussing Minnesota
cases providing greater protection under the state exclusionary remedy than
under the federal rule).
139. Under INN. STAT. § 626.21:
[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the
... court ... for the return of the property and to suppress the use, as
evidence, of anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property
was illegally seized, or (2) the property was illegally seized without
warrant, or (3) the warrant is insufficient on its face, or (4) the prop-
erty seized is not that described in the warrant, or (5) there was not
probable cause for believing the existence of the grounds on which
the warrant was issued, or (6) the warrant was illegally executed, or
(7) the warrant was improvidently issued.
MINN. STAT. § 626.21 (1990).
140. MINN. STAT. § 626.16 (1990), which provides the dispossessed person
with proof of ownership should he be entitled to return of the property,
mandates:
DELIVERY OF COPY OF WARRANT AND RECEIPT. When the
officer conducts the search the officer must give a copy of the warrant
and, when property or things are taken, a receipt therefor (specifying
it in detail) to the person in whose possession the premises or the prop-
erty or things taken were found; or, in the absence of any person, the
officer must leave such copy of the warrant and receipt in the place
where the property or things taken were found. Such delivery of a
copy of the warrant shall constitute service.
MINN. STAT. § 626.16 (1990) (emphasis added).
Other statutory provisions provide for similar notice to persons dispos-
sessed of property by a government seizure. See, e.g., id- § 27.185(3) (1990); id
§ 60B.12 (1) (1990) (liquidation of insurers); id § 974.225 (1990); i&. § 198.33
(1990) (protecting residents of Minnesota Veterans Homes).
141. See, e.g., State v. Mollberg, 310 Minn. 376, 385-87, 246 N.W.2d 463, 469-
70 (1976). The Mollberg court ruled that the police officers' failure to leave
with the defendant a copy of the search warrant describing the property taken
constituted a "defect." Because the defect was cured the next day, however,
by providing the defendant with a copy of the warrant and an inventory of the
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state has deprived the person of his property. Such recognition
indicates that the person deprived of property during a search
is the person whose property rights are violated when a court
determines that the search and seizure were unlawful. More-
over, because this person is the person "aggrieved by an unlaw-
ful search and seizure," only this person can invoke the
exclusionary rule to exclude evidence obtained during the un-
lawful search and seizures. 142 By tying the ability to exclude
evidence to the possession of the evidence, Minnesota law indi-
cates that the state constitutional search and seizure provision
protects not only privacy, but property interests as well.143
The alleged illegality of the seized item should not invali-
date a defendant's constitutional property interest, because ex-
isting law already protects a defendant charged with illegal
possession. Even when the government alleges that seized
property is contraband, the defendant can exclude the evidence
if the seizure infringed his constitutional rights.'" Moreover,
items taken, the error did not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction for
possessing contraband. Id. at 385, 246 N.W.2d at 469.
142. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (quoting MINN. STAT.
§ 626.21 (1990) (providing that a victim of an unlawful search and seizure may
seek suppression of the seized item as evidence and petition the court for its
return)).
143. Other statutory provisions suggest that the state legislature is con-
cerned about persons who are wrongfully dispossessed of their property. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. § 35.14(2) (1990) (requiring livestock detectives to file a $2000
bond with the state for any potential damage claims by persons whose prop-
erty is wrongfully seized).
MINN. STAT. § 198.33 (1990), which states that "[r]esidents of the Minne-
sota veterans homes have the right to a legitimate expectation of privacy in
their persons and property against unreasonable searches and seizures" is not
inconsistent with this analysis. The statute simply recognizes that privacy in-
terests are protected by the fourth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion and article I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. The statute indicates
that property interests are also protected. For example, the administrator of
the home must provide written authorization "for each resident whose room
or property is to be searched;" the resident must be informed of the reasons
for the search and allowed to be present during the search; and a copy of the
administrator's authorization must be provided to the resident, as well as a re-
ceipt for any property seized. See id.
144. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (citing opinions exclud-
ing evidence in possessory crimes cases); see also Jeffers v. United States, 187
F.2d 498, 502 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (holding that the illegality of the seized object
does not defeat a defendant's constitutional property interest in the item),
qff'd, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
One might argue that by providing a remedy for an "unlawful search and
seizure," the law provides that only a person whose privacy and property
rights were infringed may seek exclusion of the evidence. Such an interpreta-
tion, however, provides no protection for those whose property rights, but not
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the defendant is presumed innocent of the charges against him;
whether the seized item is contraband is a fact properly decided
by the jury, not a judge at a suppression hearing.1 45
By providing a person whose property is seized standing to
contest the constitutionality of that seizure, courts act consist-
ently with the laws created to implement state search and
seizure rules. The rules recognize that the search and seizure
deprives the defendant of a constitutional interest, and provide
the defendant not only with proof of ownership, but also with
exclusion of the item as evidence if the government unlawfully
seized the item. Providing automatic standing to possessory
crimes defendants is consistent with these rules. Automatic
standing also helps preserve constitutionally-protected property
interests by providing greater opportunity to vindicate those
interests.' 46
privacy rights, are infringed by illegal government action. Moreover, even as-
suming such an interpretation, examining a substance to determine whether it
is contraband constitutes a search, and implicates one's legitimate expectation
of privacy in the substance, regardless of whether it turns out to be contra-
band. See supra note 114. This interpretation also contradicts precedent pro-
viding the exclusionary remedy to possessory crimes defendants whose
privacy, but not property, interests have been violated by government miscon-
duct. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text (citing Minnesota opin-
ions excluding unlawfully obtained evidence in possessory crimes cases).
145. Unlike the question of whether the defendant had a "legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy" violated by the search and seizure, the question of
whether the seized substance is contraband is an element of the state's case
against the defendant. It is therefore possible that resolving such a question at
the suppression hearing violates the defendant's constitutional right to a jury.
Moreover, even if this issue were resolved against the defendant in the sup-
pression hearing, holding that the otherwise unlawful search and seizure of
contraband does not violate the possessory defendant's rights would violate the
rule in Pluth that "[a] search which is unlawful when it begins is not made
lawful by the discovery that an offense has been committed." See State. v.
Pluth, 57 Minn. 145, 152, 195 N.W. 789, 792 (1923). Furthermore, allowing the
government to use the contraband as evidence in such cases would be inconsis-
tent with prior cases suppressing such evidence, condone an "ends justify the
means" principle, and greatly undermine the deterrent effect of the exclusion-
ary rule. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (citing at least one case
where the government deliberately executed unconstitutional searches and
seizures to obtain evidence against persons without standing to contest the
misconduct).
146. See supra notes 130, 132-34 and accompanying text (citing Minnesota
opinions providing broader protection under the state exclusionary rule than
under the federal rule).
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D. MATTERS OF PARTICULAR STATE INTEREST OR LOCAL
CONCERN
When courts consider whether matters of particular state
interest or local concern indicate a need to provide greater pro-
tection than federal law, courts apply a series of questions to
the issue before them: whether the Minnesota Supreme Court
is in a better position than the federal courts to make the par-
ticular determination because of its superior knowledge of, ex-
perience with, and proximity to the controversy; whether the
controversy should be resolved on an individualized basis, or re-
quires a broad, uniform resolution of nation-wide applicability;
and whether other circumstances mandate an interpretation in-
dependent of the federal provision. 147 Resolution of these ques-
tions reveals that unique Minnesota concerns require a broader
rule than that of other states.
Independent application of a state constitutional provision
is most appropriate in the area of criminal procedure because
the overwhelming majority of criminal prosecutions occur at
the state level. 48 Because in criminal cases courts usually are
involved more with procedural than with substantive ques-
tions, 49 the state court has the expertise to determine what
constitutes a fair trial without referring to the federal constitu-
tion. 5 0 Moreover, the United States Supreme Court's lack of
unanimity when deciding matters of criminal procedure indi-
cates that "the determination of what is constitutionally appro-
priate often differs among reasonable people."'15 ' Whether
article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution protects a
person's property interest from unlawful searches and seizures
147. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
148. Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 74. The authors quote Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), where the United States Supreme Court notech
The state courts handle the vast bulk of all criminal litigations in this
country. In 1982, more than 12 million criminal actions (excluding ju-
venile and traffic charges) were filed in the 50 state court systems and
the District of Colombia.... By comparison, approximately 32,700
criminal suits were filed in federal courts during the same year.
Id. at 1042 n.8.
149. See Fleming & Nordby, supra note 51, at 74.
150. Id.
151. Wilkins, Judicial Treatment of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the United States Constitution, 14
SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 887, 921 (1980), quoted in Fleming & Nordby, supra note
51, at 75. One cannot help but note that one of the rare cases of Supreme
Court unanimity in the area of criminal procedure came in Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), where the Court unanimously held that possessory
crimes defendants were entitled to automatic standing. See supra note 27.
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and whether possessory crimes defendants are entitled to auto-
matic standing to challenge unlawful seizures, is thus an appro-
priate question for the Minnesota Supreme Court to resolve.
An examination of relevant local court rules suggests that
the Minnesota Supreme Court should provide automatic stand-
ing to possessory crimes defendants. In Minnesota, the presen-
tation of evidence in omnibus hearings 52 is governed by
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.02, which provides
that both the prosecution and the defense may present evi-
dence and cross-examine the other's witnesses. 153 A possessory
crimes defendant wishing to challenge a search or seizure must
testify not only on direct examination to establish a connection
with the contraband sufficient for a "legitimate expectation of
privacy," but also is subject to cross-examination on the sub-
ject.'L  Consequently, the prosecution is likely to obtain infor-
mation regarding the defendant's guilt that may be used to
investigate the case and develop prosecutorial strategy. 5
Moreover, unlike other jurisdictions,'1  Minnesota courts
152. In Minnesota, the requirement of an omnibus hearing was first im-
posed in State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 551-54, 141 N.W.2d
3, 12-14 (1965). Under Rasmussen, the state must inform the defendant at ar-
raignment if it intends to use evidence obtained by a search and seizure. The
defendant may move the court to suppress the evidence at a pre-trial fact
hearing. Id. at 554, 141 N.W.2d at 14.
153. MINN. R. Caml. P. 11.02 states:
Subd. 1. Evidence. If the defendant or prosecution has demanded
a hearing on either of the issues specified by Rule 8.03, the court shall
hear and determine them upon such evidence as may be offered by
the prosecution or the defense.
Subd. 2. Cross-Examination. Upon such hearing, the defendant
and the prosecution may cross-examine the other's witnesses.
154. Id.
155. In his dissent to Salvucci, Justice Marshall noted that even if the testi-
mony wasn't used at trial, it might be helpful to the prosecution in developing
its case or deciding its trial strategy. He thus concluded that the need for auto-
matic standing for possessory crimes defendants remained. United States v.
Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 96 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. At least two states do not allow suppressed evidence as impeachment.
See State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 266, 492 P.2d 657, 664-65 (1971); Common-
wealth v. Fini, 403 Mass. 567, 572-74, 531 N.E.2d 570, 573-74 (1988). Massachu-
setts recently resurrected automatic standing for possessory crimes defendants
as a matter of state constitutional law. See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406
Mass. 592, 600, 550 N.E.2d 121, 125 (1990). Hawaii, however, has not accepted
the automatic standing rule for possessory crimes defendants. See State v.
Joyner, 66 Haw. 543, 546 n.1, 669 P.2d 152, 154 n.1 (1983) (declining to reach
the automatic standing issue).
Other state courts have also refused to admit suppressed evidence as im-
peachment, as a matter of state constitutional law. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow,
16 Cal. 3d 101, 113, 545 P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 369 (1976); Common-
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allow the prosecution to use suppressed evidence for impeach-
ment purposes.157 Minnesota also admits a defendant's prior
statement as impeachment under Minnesota Rules of Evidence
613 and 801(d)(1). 51 These rules, applied together, suggest that
a defendant's suppression hearing testimony is admissible as
impeachment at trial. 59 Therefore, unlike other states that
completely suppress pre-trial testimony as evidence,L6° Minne-
sota allows a defendant's suppression hearing testimony to be
admitted against him at trial to establish credibility or to im-
wealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 247, 341 A.2d 62, 69 (1975). Both of these cases,
however, have been superceded by constitutional amendment. See People v.
May, 44 Cal. 3d 309, 318-19, 748 P.2d 307, 312, 243 Cal. Rptr. 369, 374 (1988);
Commonwealth v. Batson, 396 Pa. Super. 513, 515, 578 A.2d 1330, 1332 (1990).
157. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980) (holding that the
government may introduce illegally obtained evidence as impeachment to con-
tradict the defendant's response to a proper cross-examination question); Har-
ris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (holding that the government may
cross-examine and impeach the defendant about any statements taken in viola-
tion of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), after the defendant testifies to
the contents of the statement on direct examination); Walder v. United States,
347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (holding that the government may impeach the defend-
ant on cross-examination with illegally-seized evidence after the defendant
"opened the door" on direct by denying he had seen the evidence). Minnesota
follows these precedents. See State v. Forcier, 420 N.W.2d 884, 887 (Minn.
1988); State v. Provost, 386 N.W.2d 341, 343 (Mimi. Ct. App. 1986).
158. MINN. R. EvID. 613(b) provides, in pertinent part: "Extrinsic evidence
of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the wit-
ness is afforded a prior opportunity to explain or deny the same and the oppo-
site party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or the
interests of justice otherwise require." MINN. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) provides that
a statement is not hearsay if "[t]he statement is offered against a party and is
• . . the party's own statement, in either an individual or representative
capacity."
159. See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 96-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that Simmons and Harris leave open the possibility that suppression-hearing
testimony can be used for impeachment purposes). The Salvucci majority
hinted that this is so, but did not attempt to resolve the issue. Id. at 93-94; see
also W. LAFAVE, supra note 28, § 11.3 (criticizing the Salvucci majority for
"sidestep[ping]" the impeachment problem left open in Simmons); Comment,
supra note 54, at 585-86 (discussing the impeachment problem left open by
Simmons).
The official comment to Minnesota's omnibus hearing rules also recognize
this possibility: "[Rule 11.02] leaves to judicial interpretation the consequences
of the defendant's testimony at a[n] [omnibus] or similar evidentiary hearing,
that is, whether it may be used against him at trial substantively or by way of
impeachment." MINN. R. CiFM. P. 11 (official comment) (citations omitted); see
also H. McCARR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE § 24.4, at 186-87 (1990) (reaching a sim-
ilar conclusion).
160. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (observing at least two
states that do not allow suppressed evidence as impeachment).
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peach the defendant's trial testimony.161
These local rules reveal the need for automatic standing if
possessory crimes defendants are to avoid the "self-incrimina-
tion dilemma."'' 62 In the introductory hypothetical case, Smith
may be discouraged from testifying at the suppression hearing,
for fear that the prosecution will use her suppression hearing
testimony against her as impeachment if she later testifies at
trial. 6 3 By remaining silent at the hearing, however, she is not
161. See State v. Christenson, 371 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
(stating that "[t]estimony given by a defendant in support of a motion to sup-
press cannot be admitted as evidence of guilt at trial and can be used only for
impeachment purposes," adding almost as an afterthought, "if at all").
162. An alternative approach might be to refuse to apply the Harris rule to
suppression-hearing testimony, and interpret Simmons to protect Smith from
the use of such testimony on the issue of credibility, as well as guilt. Although
seemingly persuasive, this approach would be inadequate. First, the United
States Supreme Court was careful to limit Simmons to pre-trial testimony
used in the state's case-in-chief. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
394 (1968). Moreover, the Salvucci Court indicated that the Harris rule al-
lowing suppressed evidence as impeachment could be extended to pre-trial tes-
timony. See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 93-94. Thus, an opinion applying Simmons to
impeachment evidence would likely be overruled as a matter of federal consti-
tutional law.
Second, even if grounded in the Minnesota Constitution, such a solution
would provide Smith with only partial protection from the "self-incrimination
dilemma." Although the prosecutor would no longer be able to use her testi-
mony as impeachment, he still might use the testimony in investigating his
case against Smith, and thereby gain an advantage from her incriminating
statements. See United States v. Savucci, 448 U.S. 83, 96 (1980) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Thus, Smith would still be deterred from testifying at the pre-
trial hearing.
Third, adherence to the federal "legitimate expectation of privacy" test ig-
nores the evidence suggesting that the framers intended to protect property
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Failing to provide auto-
matic standing permits the state to continue to argue contradictory positions,
ie. that Smith possessed the pills for purposes of the criminal statute, but did
not possess them for purposes of the state constitution. See Commonwealth v.
Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 600, 550 N.E.2d 121, 125 (1990) (finding that because
possession of the seized objects is a factor in determining whether a defendant
had a legitimate expectation of privacy, the government still contradicted itself
by arguing that the defendant did not possess the contraband for standing pur-
poses, but did possess it for purposes of the criminal statute). Furthermore,
adhering to the federal standard ignores the independent protections provided
by the Minnesota Constitution, and the courts' role in preserving those protec-
tions. Providing automatic standing is thus the most logical, and complete,
remedy for possession crimes defendants. See also Comment, supra note 54, at
590 (arguing that the automatic standing rule "avoids wasteful pretrial mo-
tions, because the government's charge itself provides the basis for standing").
163. See Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). A possessory
crimes defendant would be understandably reluctant to testify to possession of
alleged contraband to establish a constitutionally-protected interest in the
seized item, if his testimony is admissible later as impeachment. This is true
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likely to establish standing to suppress the illegally-obtained
evidence.' 4 If Minnesota courts grant Smith automatic stand-
ing to contest the search, however, she will not face the self-
incrimination dilemma. The automatic standing rule thus sup-
ports her constitutional right to testify in her own defense, 165 as
well as challenge unreasonable searches and seizures.16
CONCLUSION
In the last twenty years, the United States Supreme Court
has greatly reduced the effectiveness of the fourth amendment,
limiting the provision's protections to those who have a "legiti-
mate expectation of privacy" in the area searched or the item
seized. This rule is vague, unworkable, subject to judicial ma-
even if the defendant is required to show a "legitimate expectation of privacy."
See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (noting that "petitioner's
ownership of the drugs is undoubtedly one fact to be considered in this case"
in determining whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy). Although
in theory the evidence is only to be considered for the purpose of evaluating
the defendant's credibility, this theory is impractical, as the evidence is nor-
mally highly incriminating. See Note, supra note 131, at 374 n.81 (1981); see
also W. LAFAvE, supra note 28, § 11.3.
There is some indication that even persons accused of non-possessory
crimes are deterred from testifying at pre-trial hearings. See Christenson, 371
N.W.2d at 232. Such deterrence applies a fortiori to possessory crimes defend-
ants, who may be required to admit to an essential element of their alleged
crime to get standing.
164. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting the United States
Supreme Court's long-held rule limiting fourth amendment challenges to
those who can show they are entitled to the amendment's protections).
165. It is well accepted that a defendant's right to testify in her own de-
fense is fundamental to due process in a criminal case. See, e.g., Rock v. Ar-
kansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49-53 (1987); State v. Rosillo, 281 N.W.2d 877, 878 (Minn.
1979).
166. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (examining the Jones
Court's conclusion that a possessory crimes defendant enters a "self-incrimina-
tion dilemma" if forced to testify at a pre-trial suppression hearing). Several
state courts have found similarly, even under the "legitimate expectation of
privacy" test. See, e.g., Amendola, 406 Mass. at 600, 550 N.E.2d at 125; State v.
Settle, 122 N.H. 214, 217-19, 447 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (1982); State v. Alston, 88
N.J. 211, 228, 440 A.2d 1311, 1320 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 66,
470 A.2d 457, 468 (1983); State v. Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 179-80, 622 P.2d
1199, 1206 (1980).
One might argue that even if Smith has standing to contest the seizure, it
was only made unreasonable by the illegal search, which she does not have
standing to contest. Thus, Smith should not be allowed to suppress the am-
phetamines as evidence if the officer had probable cause to suspect they were
contraband. This analysis, however, ignores the substantial policy reasons for
allowing Smith to cite the illegality of the search that led to the seizure in ar-
guing that the seizure was unreasonable. See Simien, supra note 20, at 558-59;
see also supra note 114.
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nipulation, and provides insufficient protection to persons ac-
cused of possessory crimes. For these reasons, several states
have responded by interpreting their state constitutions to pro-
tect property rights, and have granted automatic standing to
possessory crimes defendants to challenge allegedly unreasona-
ble searches and seizures.
The Minnesota Supreme Court should interpret article I,
section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution to protect property
rights, as well as privacy rights, against unreasonable searches
and seizures. Such an interpretation is consistent with the
drafters' intent, state common law, and existing state law defin-
ing the scope of the state constitutional provision. Moreover,
the court should grant automatic standing to persons accused of
possessory crimes to contest allegedly unlawful searches and
seizures. This result would be consistent with the property
rights interpretation of article I, section 10, and would help pre-
serve those rights for Minnesota citizens.
Kent M. Williams
1991] 1301

